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Executive Summary 
This analysis examines the regional political impact of South Sudan’s 
independence on its neighbours. It takes into account the emergence 
of South Sudan as an independent nation, which has resulted in a new 
rapport de forces among the neighbouring states. This region of Africa 
is made up of countries with a history of conflicts and poor govern-
ance. State authority is weak – particularly in the border areas between 
Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda to the east; and Chad, the Central 
African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo to the west. 
Referred to here as an ‘ellipse of insecurity’, this vast area of instabil-
ity defines the regional focus of the present analysis.  
 
Our analysis covers the six-month period from July to December 
2011. It examines the initial period of statehood for South Sudan and 
some of the primary challenges facing the world’s newest state, fol-
lowing its emergence from decades-long conflict to achieve independ-
ence and establish its national identity. It reviews the potential region-
al consequences of the internal dynamics of South Sudan, as well as 
its unresolved relationship with Sudan, taking into consideration the 
complex political and security situation that has emerged in Sudan 
since July 2011.  
 
In South Sudan, the government is faced with the priority task of 
building a stable, inclusive, democratic and prosperous state. This is a 
huge endeavour for a diverse society composed of numerous ethnic 
groups which for years have been divided through political and social 
polarization, poverty and economic marginalization, oppression, civil 
strife and war. In addition to developing a systematic approach to 
dealing with the root causes of its current violent conflicts, at the  
operational level the South Sudan must develop adequate structures of 
governance and the institutional capacities necessary to make them 
work effectively. These structures and capacities will have to be built 
up from scratch – a daunting task for an impoverished and fragile 
state.   
 
More concretely, this analysis looks at three specific challenges that 
confront the government of South Sudan: resolving domestic conflict, 
comprehensive reform of the security sector, and creating genuinely 
representative politics. This overview of South Sudan finishes with a 
discussion of key issues related to its external relations. 
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In Sudan, the secession of South Sudan has effectively destabilized 
the centre of gravity of power in Khartoum, with the regime feeling 
under threat and seriously weakened. Our discussion assesses the  
divisions within the National Congress Party, relations between the 
political leadership and the Sudan Armed Forces and the violent con-
flicts underway in Sudan, particularly in South Kordofan, Blue Nile 
and Darfur. The ongoing conflicts in Blue Nile and South Kordofan 
further complicate inter-state relations. Instability in these regions has 
a profound impact on Sudan’s domestic political environment and also 
on the security and development of South Sudan, in turn affecting re-
gional stability. Our analysis also takes into account possible domino 
effects of the Arab Spring. The main conclusion here is that the politi-
cal leadership of Sudan seems to have opted for the familiar path of 
confrontation, mistrust and political manoeuvring, thus creating ever-
greater hostility towards South Sudan, which cannot but further desta-
bilize the domestic situations of both countries and eventually impact 
on the broader region. This follows a deeply-entrenched historical pat-
tern of brinksmanship, revenge and political intrigue – characteristics 
that have defined the prevailing political culture in many corners of 
this unstable region for decades. The leaders in both Khartoum and 
Juba will have to recognize the importance of cooperation that can 
lead to workable political and economic solutions – for the sake of 
their own national, personal political and economic interests, and most 
importantly for the well-being of their populations. The incentives for 
peace must outweigh the incentives for violence. 
 
Relations between Khartoum and Juba are heavily influenced by the 
outstanding issues in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) which have created obstacles to progress in both Sudan and 
South Sudan. Important unresolved CPA issues include fair and equi-
table oil revenue-sharing between Sudan and South Sudan, joint secur-
ity protocols, demarcation of the disputed common border, and the 
status of Abyei. Dealing with the status of Abyei is particularly  
urgent, as the conflict between the Misseryia and Dinka groups is 
closely linked to the national-level conflict between Sudan and South 
Sudan. While we acknowledge the role of the African Union High-
Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) in facilitating resolution of  
these outstanding issues, these issues have the potential to further de-
stabilize relations between Khartoum and Juba, as well as the broader 
region. The international community is urged to acknowledge that 
normalizing north–south relations is the most pressing regional issue, 
as failure to do so could have serious repercussions for peace and se-
curity in the entire region. To this end, the international community 
should emphasize the high degree of economic, security and social 
interdependence between both countries, and should also increase 
their support to the AUHIP.  
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The ellipse of insecurity consists of the hinterlands of Chad and the 
Central African Republic, on their eastern frontiers, and the corre-
sponding border regions in Sudan (Darfur), as well as South Sudan 
(Western Bahr Al-Ghazal, Western Equatoria and Central Equatoria 
states). It also includes the northeastern territories of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. When national and state-level authority is weak, 
merely symbolic or virtually non-existent, such regions become fertile 
ground for the emergence of armed groups, local militias, outlaws and 
criminals. The incapacity of the formal state authorities to exercise 
law and order, border protection and basic human security in these 
remote areas has transformed them into one of the most dangerous 
parts of Africa. In this context, Uganda has become a key player in 
matters of regional security. The entry point for Uganda’s greater in-
volvement in the region has been the fight against the Lord’s Resi-
stance Army, a terrorist group with Ugandan roots which operates 
within the ellipse of insecurity.  
 
This report also examines the roles of two key international actors, the 
United States and China, in relation to their capacities to contribute 
toward easing tensions between Sudan and South Sudan and to pro-
mote peace in the region. US mediation was critical for the signing of 
the CPA. During the period between the signing of the CPA and the 
referendum on independence in 2011, the USA played a major role in 
advising the leaders from both the north and the south to adhere to the 
agreement and keep the peace. In many ways, the relative success of 
the transition phase is very much linked to this strong, proactive US 
involvement with key actors in Sudan. Peace and security in the re-
gion now require a renewed US engagement, particularly in establish-
ing stronger dialogue with Khartoum. Although the USA has 
acknowledged the African Union as the lead actor in negotiations over 
outstanding CPA issues, Washington still has an important role to 
play, in relation to more actively supporting AUHIP initiatives and in 
terms of offering incentives that can encourage both sides to come to 
agreement.  
 
Sudan and South Sudan are serious testing grounds for China as an 
international actor, especially with respect to issues of governance for 
creating the foundations for regional stability, security and develop-
ment. Although China has been making overtures to South Sudan, it 
must also maintain good relations with Sudan. This may position Chi-
na as a key influential partner in the region, able to exert constructive 
influence on other key regional actors, Sudan in particular. China’s 
economic diplomacy can be used as political leverage to promote co-
operation between these two states by working to bridge the interests 
of Khartoum and Juba. To reinforce the constructive role China could 
play in the region, other members of the international community, es-
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pecially the USA and other key donors to South Sudan, should look 
for ways of working more closely with Beijing. Experience has shown 
that when western countries consciously seek to involve China in their 
Africa policies, as was the case in Chad in 2008–2010, the Chinese 
response can be positive. Enhanced cooperation between the USA and 
China in the region would have a lasting impact on stabilization. 
 
This analysis concludes with specific policy recommendations to re-
gional and international actors, designed to enhance preventive diplo-
macy. 
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Introduction1  
The January 2011 referendum in South Sudan was a watershed event 
in the long, violent and tension-filled historical process that led to the 
separation of Sudan into two distinct states. The southern population 
voted overwhelmingly for an independent South Sudan, and the newly 
emerging country is now joining the international community. This 
will continue to have wide-ranging and multi-dimensional political, 
economic and social consequences – for Sudan and South Sudan, for 
relations between these two states and for the broader region.  
 
The world’s newest nation state, South Sudan, is struggling to estab-
lish itself as a sovereign nation in a region of Africa defined by ex-
traordinary fragility. As indicated by the Failed States Index 2011,
2
 
four of the world’s most fragile (if not failed) states lie in this part of 
the world: Somalia tops the list, closely followed by Chad, then Sudan 
as number three and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as 
number four.
3
 The nearby Central African Republic (CAR) ranks in 
eighth place, with Kenya at 16, Ethiopia 20, and Uganda 21. Except 
for Chad and Somalia, all these states share a common border with 
South Sudan, which is widely regarded as extremely fragile itself. 
Thus the early days of South Sudanese independence add an addition-
al layer of instability and complexity to this already volatile region. 
Both risks and responsibilities accompany this new-found freedom. 
The most pressing of these will be examined here. 
Complex and Shifting Dynamics of Conflict 
In addition to the specific internal challenges and the shared problems 
related to full implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA), stability in Sudan and South Sudan, as well as in 
the broader region, is threatened by complex and shifting conflict dy-
namics. Although many of these conflicts occur in the disputed border 
areas and therefore must be seen in relation to the broader north–south 
conflict, there are also local or community-level conflicts with their 
own internal dynamics defined by, inter alia, access to basic resources 
– land, pastures and water. In addition to being interrelated to state 
                                                 
1  The authors are deeply grateful to Ingrid Marie Breidlid, Advisor at the Norwegian Insti-
tute of International Affairs (NUPI), for substantive feedback and advice throughout the 
production of this report, including detailed review of and comments on the final draft. 
2  Failed States Index 2011, Foreign Policy, July/August 2011. Subsequent references in the 
text to this Index are drawn from this source. 
3  In 2010 the DRC was ranked 5, which demonstrates the increasing instability of the coun-
try. 
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and/or national level conflicts, local-level conflicts can spill across 
into neighbouring states and acquire regionalized dimensions. Griev-
ances and disputes at the local level have been effectively manipulated 
by state and national interests throughout the region. Such conflicts 
can rapidly escalate to become entangled at the national level. When 
important mineral resources are at stake, such as oil, gold, diamonds, 
uranium and other strategic resources, third-party involvement and 
other outside interests further impact on already complex conflict dy-
namics. In turn, these dynamics have a profound effect on the chal-
lenging tasks of state- and nation-building. 
 
Central governments and rebel militia groups alike have been known 
to exploit one another in pursuit of their own interests in this region. 
This is a sophisticated, dynamic form of power politics played out 
across the shifting and multiple landscapes of tribal and ethnic territo-
ries, local communities, state authorities and/or national governments, 
which sometimes do and at other times do not intersect. In other 
words, powerful actors – whether tribal leaders, militia commanders, 
local, state or national level politicians – cleverly and expediently seek 
their own self-interested advantage in order to hold on to and consoli-
date power, however they may perceive this. Often, revenge, mistrust 
and historical animosities are driving forces for these complicated and 
multi-layered conflicts. 
 
From a geopolitical perspective, the splitting of Sudan into two states 
may be regarded with apprehension by political leaders in the region 
whose countries share similar ethnic, cultural, economic and political 
divides. For such observers, the primary point is that the fracture of 
Sudan could serve as a model for similar conflicts elsewhere in the 
region. If the southern populations could separate from Sudan and be-
come independent, why can’t other peoples do the same, in contexts 
that can be considered as comparable to the Sudanese? If the funda-
mental principle of the African Union as absolute respect for the bor-
ders inherited from colonial times could be ignored in the case of Su-
dan, and populations can be permitted to separate along ethno-cultural 
lines, could not Chad or Nigeria or Cote d’Ivoire, for instance, follow 
the same path as a way of addressing the profound inequalities, dis-
crimination and marginalization that define their own domestic situa-
tions?  
 
Closer observation of developments in the region, however, indicates 
that a break-up à la mode of Sudan is not the key political dimension 
that could influence national or regional politics in the region. Nor 
should an Arab versus Christian/Bantu divide be considered as a rele-
vant analytic paradigm. The Sudanese process that led to the creation 
of a new country is unique, a political-military process that began im-
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mediately following decolonization in 1956. Evidence on the ground 
does not support the view that Sudanese independence processes are 
likely to encourage any serious new attempts to replicate the same 
elsewhere in the region – not even in the case of Chad, which has the 
closest situation to the cultural mix that prevailed in Sudan before July 
2011.  
 
What is of great significance is that the regional balance of power has 
been impacted by the formation of a new state. It is therefore im-
portant to analyse the strategic ramifications of the establishment of 
South Sudan in this complex region, examining how much this affects 
the politics of its neighbours in their relations with one another, the 
alliances, alignments, destabilizing actions and conflict of interests 
among them, as well as the strategic interests of global powers from 
outside the region, in particular China and the USA. Alongside this 
focus on state relations, it is equally important to examine how and to 
what extent internal political and security dynamics, including local-
level conflicts with significant potential to spillover into neighbouring 
states, impact on state relations, as well as on the overall stability and 
security in the region.  
Methodology 
The primary methodology informing this analysis is qualitative and 
derives from an experience-based approach. This includes political 
insight that draws on the main author's extensive knowledge, long-
term observation and hands-on experience of the region. This is sup-
ported by key-informant interviews with primary and related stake-
holders, based on the author’s network of relevant contacts in the re-
gion. A desk study with systematic review of open sources has also 
been undertaken, examining media coverage, briefing papers and re-
ports from international organizations, official documents and govern-
ment statements. The methodology has been further refined by a con-
flict analysis model oriented to gaining a deeper understanding of the 
dynamics of fragile states. This analysis also seeks to contribute to a 
more operational understanding of this concept. 
 
Here, a ‘fragile state’ is taken to be one that is extremely vulnerable to 
internal and external shocks, especially to conflict within and beyond 
its borders. The capacity of a fragile state to deliver basic services like 
security and territorial control, and to ensure the economic, political, 
social, cultural and physical well-being of its citizens, is seriously 
compromised. The primary institutions of a fragile state suffer from a 
range of dysfunctions that create persistent crises. Thus, a fragile state 
is defined by significant inequalities, patterns of marginalization and 
exclusion, lack of minimum human security and the inability to pro-
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vide basic protection for human and political rights. The overall effect 
of such wide-ranging deficits and the ensuing profound problems is to 
undermine and de-legitimate state authority across multiple levels. 
 
Current conventional wisdom about fragile and/or failed states holds that they 
pose a serious threat to international security. However: The brutal truth is that 
the vast majority of weak, failing, and failed states pose risks primarily to their 
own inhabitants. When governments cannot discharge basic functions, their citi-
zens pay the heaviest price. Countries in the top ranks of the FSI [Failed States 
Index] face a much higher risk of internal conflict, civil violence, and humanitar-
ian catastrophe (both natural and man-made). They are settings for the worst 
human rights abuses, the overwhelming source of the world's refugees, and the 
places where most UN peacekeepers must go... Beyond those living in such 
countries, the heaviest brunt of state failure is borne by neighbouring states; vio-
lent conflict, refugee flows, arms trafficking, and disease are rarely contained 
within national borders.
4
 
 
In short, pervasive human and state insecurity are primary conse-
quences of state fragility and failure, the heaviest burdens of which are 
borne by the citizens of these states. Each and every one of the coun-
tries in this region reflects these harsh realities. In some of them (Su-
dan, South Sudan, DRC and CAR) there is ongoing insurgency and 
armed conflict; others are recovering from long-term violent conflicts. 
This is a region where arms and small weapons abound, flowing 
freely, out of control. This is a region where there is little government 
authority over large swathes of peripheral parts of national territory. 
This is a region where states are unable or unwilling to provide for the 
basic, fundamental needs and rights of their citizens. 
Outline of Analysis 
This analysis examines the political consequences of the birth of 
South Sudan for the stability (or instability), peace and security of the 
region.
5
 Its scope is limited to the geopolitical area in which South 
Sudan and Sudan are located, including their immediate neighbours: 
CAR, DRC, Uganda and Chad. Passing reference is also made to 
broader regional actors like Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Egypt and  
Libya. The analysis falls into three corresponding parts. Part I exam-
ines key internal dynamics in South Sudan and Sudan, as well as 
north–south relations as these are shaped by unresolved CPA issues. 
Part II extends this analysis to examine the broader regional context to 
which South Sudan and Sudan belong, with attention to demarcating 
the ellipse of insecurity that spans the entire region. Part III considers 
the role of two key international actors, the USA and China, including 
how their policies in the region are being re-shaped to take into  
                                                 
4  Patrick Stewart, ‘The Brutal Truth’ in Foreign Policy, July/August 2011, p. 1. 
5  The analysis focuses on the six-month period, beginning in July 2011 and ending Decem-
ber 2011, with South Sudan’s formal accession to independence.  
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account the new dynamics that define regional relations, and how they 
might more constructively contribute to easing tensions between  
Sudan and South Sudan. The analysis finishes with a series of related 
policy recommendations.  
 
The central objective of this report is to identify and analyse key 
warning signs of possible fissures in governance and society that 
could lead to broader destabilization, violent conflict and insecurity in 
the region. Attention is also paid to factors that might promote greater 
stability, including how they might be better supported and encour-
aged: what are the key drivers of peace and stability, and how might 
these be strengthened? The ultimate goal is to better inform preventive 
diplomacy and related decision-making processes. As one commenta-
tor has observed, ‘Any new policy toward failed [or fragile] states 
needs to focus on prevention rather than reaction, not only to avoid the 
need for military force, but also because in many places intervention 
simply will not be possible... once violence breaks out.’6  
 
                                                 
6  James Traub, ‘Think Again’, in Foreign Policy, July/August 2011, p. 6. 
Part I. Primary Reference Points:  
Sudan and South Sudan 
The following discussion focuses on South Sudan and Sudan as pri-
mary reference points for better understanding the regional implica-
tions of South Sudan as a new state. It examines key internal dynam-
ics and challenges of each country, and the impacts on north–south 
relations. At issue in both cases is a concern to identify critical warn-
ing signs and potential flash points for heightened tensions and hostili-
ties between these two unfriendly neighbours. The analysis also takes 
into account possible drivers of peace – those factors that might con-
structively serve to defuse what is undeniably an extremely volatile 
situation.  
 
At present, relations between Sudan and South Sudan dominate the 
regional landscape, threatening even greater instability in this already 
unstable part of the world. Normalizing north–south relations is there-
fore imperative. Moreover, given their high degree of economic, secu-
rity and social interdependence, both countries would also benefit 
from peaceful relations and enhanced cooperation. 
 
For South Sudan, troubled relations with the north serve only to per-
petuate and further undermine its own internal stability. Among other 
things, hostilities with Sudan distract valuable resources and attention 
from the overwhelming domestic challenges of nation- and state-
building, which should be South Sudan’s highest priority. In his open-
ing speech to the second session of the South Sudan Legislative As-
sembly in Juba on 24 January 2011, President Salva Kiir stressed two 
points above all others: if South Sudan was to avoid the risk of be-
coming a non-viable entity, it would have to build strong relations 
with the north and create a shared national identity in the south.
7
 To 
date, these aspirations have not been achieved. 
 
Despite its own large-scale internal problems, Sudan remains intent on 
being a spoiler and trouble-maker in the region, with growing animos-
ity toward the south, especially as regards outstanding CPA issues. 
Early promises of cooperation between these two new neighbours 
vanished rapidly, replaced by aggressive rhetoric on both sides. Nor 
do Sudan’s relations with other neighbours in the region appear to be 
                                                 
7  Paul O’Grady and Geoffrey Weichselbaum, ‘Prospects for Democracy in the World’s 
Newest State’, Democracy Reporting International Country Report, April 2011, p. 8. 
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faring much better. The recent decision of the East African Communi-
ty (EAC) to prevent Sudan from joining on technical and ethical 
grounds, combined with the controversy surrounding the court deci-
sion in Kenya on President Omar Bashir and the International Crimi-
nal Court’s indictment,8 all illustrate the current state of these rela-
tions. Khartoum finds itself caught in a vicious circle of isolation – 
within its own territory and with respect to the south – where its ac-
tions only work to reinforce the unfavourable image of Sudan in the 
region. Sudan, like South Sudan, urgently requires special attention 
from the international community. Qualified engagement with Khar-
toum is the only way towards establishing greater stability and securi-
ty in the region.  
1. South Sudan: Key Internal Dynamics 
In addition to the pressing need to find a negotiated settlement to still-
unresolved CPA issues (see section 3 below), South Sudan faces two 
key strategic issues. First, the government must build a stable and 
prosperous state based on a coherent and inclusive national identity – 
after decades of marginalization, oppression, civil strife and war, deep 
political and ethnic divisions, along with poor institutional capacity, 
virtually non-existent infrastructure and widespread poverty. Second, 
the world’s newest state must build and develop relations with the 
community of nation states to which it now belongs, with focused at-
tention on developing strategic cooperative relations with its neigh-
bours in the region, Sudan in particular, and with key donors. 
 
In the best of circumstances, achieving any one of these goals would 
be daunting. Today’s South Sudan faces these and many other chal-
lenges in a deeply unstable environment, at home and in the broader 
region, and with extremely limited human and physical resources.  
1.1 State- and nation-building from scratch 
The question of the government of South Sudan’s almost total lack of 
capacity to exert sovereign authority and the politically-exclusive 
character of the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), 
which has overwhelming control over power at national and state lev-
els, remain key features of the new state, as does the more general 
need to make the difficult transition from the long fight for independ-
ence to the business of good governance: from ‘freedom fighter’ to 
politician, from rebel to civil servant or demobilized civilian, and from 
combatant to disciplined (professional) soldier in a modern force. 
                                                 
8  Toby Collins, ‘AU opposes Kenyan ruling in favour of Bashir’s ICC prosecution’ in  
Sudan Tribune, 05 December 2011. 
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These factors seriously menace the country’s stability and democrati-
zation processes, and are also major impediments to development. 
 
Among a host of urgent and overwhelming tasks related to building 
South Sudan as a nation state, three stand out as central priorities. 
South Sudan must: a) more effectively resolve its internal conflicts; b) 
undertake a comprehensive approach to creating an effective, credible 
and professionalized security sector, with a functioning judicial sys-
tem; and c) better enable a truly representative form of government. 
Addressing these closely related issues would contribute to stabilizing 
and strengthening the fragile internal situation in South Sudan. 
 
a. Resolving domestic conflict 
South Sudan continues to be a society caught up in fierce violent con-
flict with itself. According to UN sources, at least 1,500 people have 
been killed in the violence that has affected all of the south’s 10 states 
since the January 2011 referendum.
9
 This number rose steeply with 
the inter-tribal violence in Pibor in Jonglei state in late December 
2011, where unconfirmed estimates from local authorities indicate that 
more than 3,000 people were killed and tens of thousands more dis-
placed. There are no less than seven significant rebel militias currently 
fighting against the government, plus an undetermined number of oth-
er local armed groups.
10
 Violent clashes between these armed groups 
and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) are a common oc-
currence, giving rise to massive displacements in affected areas.
11
 
There are also deep ethno-political divisions within the SPLA, and 
divisions between the SPLA and government leaders in Juba. All this 
is made more complex by tendencies to link local-level grievances to 
nation-level politics. In addition to tensions along the border with Su-
dan, there is also insecurity and tension along the borders to Kenya, 
Uganda and Ethiopia.  
 
As regards rebel militias, thus far the Juba government has taken an 
approach defined by buying them off (patronage in the form of exces-
sively high ranks and/or financial incentives) or attempting military 
defeat. Neither approach has been successful, but arguably instead has 
added to the emergence of new rebellions and greater instability. On 
the one hand, patronage sends a message to local militia leaders that, 
at the end of the road, they can expect some form of compensation 
worth fighting for. On the other hand, aggressive SPLA tactics have 
backfired: they have angered the local communities aligned with mili-
                                                 
9   This is a conservative UN estimate based on reported incidents, as of mid-December 2011. 
10  ‘Fighting for Spoils: Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile’, Sudan Issue Brief, Hu-
man Security Baseline Assessment, Small Arms Survey, 18 November 2011, p. 3. 
11  For example, the OCHA Humanitarian Appeal for 2012 indicates that an estimated 
300,000 people have been displaced since southern independence. 
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tia groups and created conditions for continued instability and the es-
calation of violence.
12
  
 
By failing to resolve these conflicts, as well as continuing to ignore 
their underlying root causes, the government in Juba perpetuates the 
fragilities of its own state and contributes to increasing instability in 
the region. None of the post-conflict processes related to disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration, including civilian disarmament, 
have been properly planned for – whether by the South Sudanese gov-
ernment or by the international community. Implementation of activi-
ties in these areas has remained largely ad hoc. State- and nation-
building in South Sudan will require a comprehensive conflict man-
agement package to help establish lasting peace within the country. 
An integrated and coordinated approach should be fully supported by 
South Sudan’s top political leadership, and backed by an alliance of 
key international partners. In particular, consideration should be given 
to linking up the current phase of national construction to the support 
that could be provided by the UN Peacebuilding Commission. South 
Sudan is, of all cases, the best suited for inclusion in the mandate of 
the Commission. A decision on this matter is expected during the first 
half of 2012. 
 
b. Comprehensive reform of the security sector 
Closely related to the need to settle internal conflicts, it is time to plan 
for holistic reform and reconstruction of the armed and security forc-
es. As part of developing the professionalism of the SPLA (an objec-
tive assisted mainly by the US Department of Defense, with some UK 
participation), it is crucial to recognize the need to re-organize the mil-
itary, reduce its numbers, demobilize those who are no longer neces-
sary or cannot respond to the new tasks assigned to the national armed 
forces, reintegrate demobilized military personnel into civilian life, 
and bring balanced representation to the institution in terms of ethnic 
composition. It is estimated, for example, that the SPLA has between 
170,000 and 180,000 troops, the majority of whom are Dinka. Close 
to 90% of the soldiers and officers are illiterate, which poses addition-
al challenges for successful reintegration. The transformation of this 
armed force into a modern army is thus a major undertaking that will 
require considerable resources, a carefully planned multi-year pro-
gramme and close attention to the issue of reintegration, which must 
be seen as an essential component of the broader development agenda 
for South Sudan – especially as civilian employment opportunities are 
so limited. The donor community must address this crucial strategic 
matter in close liaison with the government, and in a tightly coordinat-
ed and carefully phased manner. Without an overall strategy for re-
                                                 
12  ‘Fighting for Spoils: Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile’, Sudan Issue Brief, Hu-
man Security Baseline Assessment, Small Arms Survey, 18 November 2011, p. 9. 
Security and Stability: Reflections on the Impact of South Sudan on Regional Political Dynamics 23 
 
23 
form, this process may turn extremely volatile, as has been seen in the 
growing hostilities between army factions and the government. 
 
Other components of the security sector, such as the prison service, 
and the national and state police forces, are also in need of large-scale 
reform and capacity building. These activities should go hand-in-hand 
with strengthening the justice system, which is almost non-existent. 
There is ample evidence and experience available from neighbouring 
countries, as well as throughout the whole of Africa, in such reform 
initiatives and processes.
13
 There are valuable lessons to be learned, in 
terms of both the successes and failures of similar undertakings else-
where. Particularly crucial is the need to involve relevant civil society 
organizations in all efforts related to security sector reform. 
 
c. Creating genuinely representative politics 
The government in Juba must make a strong and genuine commitment 
to establishing inclusive, representative government at all levels: na-
tional, state and local. With most resources and power concentrated in 
Juba, the goal of decentralized state authority remains elusive. Trans-
parency and accountability are equally important. South Sudan is a 
diverse and multi-ethnic society, with more than 60 ethnic and linguis-
tic groups. The government in Juba must not only pay attention to 
building state institutions from scratch, but must also focus on estab-
lishing national unity amidst great diversity, in particular as this can 
be reflected in those very state institutions it is creating. As Kiir has 
stated: 
  
Creating and forging a common identity for all Southern Sudanese irrespective 
of ethnicity, region or creed is... imperative... [W]hat is critical is the maturity to 
recognize the fact that none of our communities can go it alone. ...It is now time 
to consolidate the unity of the people of Southern Sudan and cease from point-
less manoeuvres and conspiracies that will take us nowhere.
14
 
 
Are such inclusive aspirations that value the rich diversity of South 
Sudan’s peoples already in jeopardy? There are well-founded fears 
that SPLM dominance of the national and state legislature, combined 
with the experience from the general elections in 2010 and trends re-
lated to constitutional reform, will result in South Sudan becoming a 
de facto one-party state.
15
 Grievances and political wrangling at the 
state and national levels appear to indicate that discontent is growing, 
                                                 
13  Mozambique, which was in a very similar situation in terms of a lack of the minimum 
critical mass of basically trained human resources, might offer valuable insights. 
14  Opening speech by President Kiir to the second session of the South Sudan Legislative 
Assembly, Juba, 24 January 2011.  
15  For an in-depth analysis of constitutional reform in South Sudan, see Paul O’Grady and 
Geoffrey Weichselbaum, ‘Prospects for Democracy in the World’s Newest State’, De-
mocracy Reporting International Country Report, April 2011. 
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which some link to what they see as the SPLM politics of exclusion.
16
 
Dinka domination of the armed forces and the economy is a cause for 
concern, as are nepotism, cronyism, lack of meritocracy in hiring 
practices, corruption, as well as tribal, age and gender biases.  
 
As one commentator asserts, ‘… South Sudan must defy the reality in 
Africa that losing an election means remaining in the cold until the 
next election, a situation that polarizes and raises political tempera-
tures that sometimes lead to conflict.’17 Although the SPLM managed 
to create a sense of unity during the war of liberation, it must now 
forge a renewed and redefined sense of national unity from the ele-
ments of representative democracy in a fractious, multi-cultural socie-
ty. 
1.2 Diplomatic Priorities for the World’s Newest State 
As a result of joining the world community as an internationally rec-
ognized independent state, South Sudan now has the right to establish 
diplomatic relations with every member of the United Nations. At this 
stage, mindful of its limited resources, South Sudan would be best ad-
vised to focus its initial diplomatic initiatives on its own immediate 
region, with a concerted focus on improving relations with its northern 
neighbour. Alongside this, efforts should be made to improve and 
build on its relations with key donors and development partners, in-
cluding the USA, the UK and Norway (‘the Troika’), as well as the 
UN, World Bank, African Union and more recently, Turkey and Chi-
na. 
 
At present, South Sudan maintains 13 embassies abroad, including in 
key neighbouring countries like Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, the DRC 
and Kenya. However, it has no diplomatic missions in Sudan, Chad or 
the Central African Republic. As an important step toward normaliz-
ing north–south relations, South Sudan urgently must open an embas-
sy in Khartoum, as Sudan did in Juba. This would not only help facili-
tate better dialogue and reduce growing tensions between Khartoum 
and Juba, but such a move would also bring benefits to those citizens 
of South Sudan who will continue to live in the north. Protecting the 
rights of its own citizens has become a more pressing matter for South 
Sudan: on 13 January 2011, the parliament in Khartoum passed a law 
cancelling the Sudanese nationality of people from the south or whose 
origins could be traced to what was to become South Sudan. This law 
                                                 
16  Joost van der Zvan, Evaluating the EU’s Role and Challenges in Sudan and South Sudan, 
September 2011, International Alert, p. 14. 
17  Kizito Sabala, ‘Sudan: Beyond the 2011 Referendum’, African Peace and Conflict Jour-
nal, Volume 4, Number 1, June 2011, p. 58. 
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is unjust and violates basic rights of the citizens. Its abrogation should 
be part of negotiations between the two countries.18 
 
Despite the imperative to develop these crucial relations, South Sudan 
is currently determined to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. 
This is evident in the December 2011 visit of President Kiir to Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem and the significant Israeli 
diplomatic presence that is planned for Juba. Here it is strategically 
important for the leadership in South Sudan to be clear about what 
deeper ties with Israel mean. This must be fully understood by South 
Sudan’s regional neighbours, especially Sudan and Egypt. Two main 
issues must be clarified in this regard, with both South Sudan and  
Israel bearing a burden of responsibility to do so.  
 
First, lack of transparency about the reasons for deepening South Su-
danese–Israeli relations raises the stakes in Khartoum. For example, in 
a tit-for-tat response to Kiir’s visit to Israel, the Sudanese regime took 
no time to invite the chairperson of Hamas, Ismael Haniyah (who is 
also the political leader and the de facto prime minister in the Gaza 
Strip), to Khartoum. If ambiguities about deeper relations with Israel 
persist, that may further erode north–south relations and consequently 
contribute to further regional destabilization. Khartoum’s invitation to 
Haniyah also indicates that if South Sudanese–Israeli relations remain 
unclear, then this has a broader, albeit indirect potential to affect Israe-
li/Palestinian relations. In Khartoum, Israel is perceived as a threat, for 
reasons that have much to do with the pan-Arabism policies of Bashir 
and his close relations with extremist elements within the Palestine 
cause, as well as in view of recent allegations of drone activity over 
eastern Sudan.19 Khartoum’s invitation to Haniyah appears to signal 
that Sudan is ready to expand its support to Hamas through both fi-
nancial and military assistance.  
 
In particular, the South Sudanese leadership cannot give the impres-
sion that their security concerns will be responded to with the direct or 
indirect assistance of Israel, especially in relation to actual or per-
ceived security threats from the north. Some 40 years ago, as older 
SPLM/A members will undoubtedly recall, Israel sent military teams 
to help train SPLA combatants. Equally so, Khartoum has not forgot-
                                                 
18  In what was regarded as a breakthrough, Sudan and South Sudan negotiated and initialed 
framework agreements on nationalities in March 2012. These agreements permit nationals 
of each state the rights to enjoy ‘freedom of residence, freedom of movement, freedom to 
undertake economic activity and freedom to acquire and dispose property’ (quoted in 
‘North, South sign agreements on nationality, border demarcation’ by  Tesfa-Alem Tekle, 
Sudan Tribune, 14 April 2012). This agreement should have been signed by both presi-
dents at the planned summit meeting in Juba in April 2012, but this meeting was post-
poned due to growing tensions between both countries. Confusion around the 8 April 
2012 deadline for southerners resident in the north to return to the south to obtain the nec-
essary documentation for residency in the north has also complicated matters. 
19  ‘Sudanese president says Israel behind airstrike on convoy’, Sudan Tribune, 26 April 
2009. 
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ten this. There is already a strong Israeli presence in the region (not all 
of it of a diplomatic nature), especially in Ethiopia, but also in Kenya, 
Eritrea and Uganda. From the perspective of Khartoum, strengthening 
Israeli cooperation with South Sudan looks very much like another 
step towards closing the circle around Sudan. 
 
Second, development cooperation with Israel in the area of water 
management can leave no space for ambiguity. This means, above all, 
that Israeli support must not be perceived as an attempt at controlling 
the waters of the Nile in a manner that would threaten the vital inter-
ests of countries downstream, notably Sudan and Egypt. With ratifica-
tion, the Nile Basin Cooperation Framework Agreement of 2010 
(which entered into force in March 2011) would remove Egypt’s pre-
vious powers to veto upstream countries from developing hydro-
projects. Both Sudan and Egypt are against the agreement. It is there-
fore crucial for South Sudan to provide clear guarantees that the Nile 
waters will not be interrupted. This is of vital importance as regards 
the regional external relations puzzle.  
 
Such diplomatic moves raise a question about responsibility. South 
Sudan has an obligation to act responsibly and transparently in its dip-
lomatic relations, particularly those perceived as sensitive in relation 
to regional stability. However, the international community is equally 
bound to act responsibly in its efforts to establish and/or deepen dip-
lomatic relations with South Sudan. This is a mutual obligation to con-
tribute constructively to, not undermine, a region that is defined by a 
collection of fragile states. Supporting stability in South Sudan, and 
therefore the broader region, is in the best interests of the entire inter-
national community. 
2. Sudan: Key Internal Dynamics 
Sudan is now a more fragile state than before the January 2011 refer-
endum for southern secession and the creation of South Sudan as an 
independent state six months later, on 9 July that year. A range of fac-
tors have contributed to the growing instability in Sudan, several of 
the most important of which are considered here. Closer examination 
of these factors can offer insight into current Sudanese political reali-
ties – not only as these bear on domestic dynamics, but also as they 
impact on north–south relations, the broader region and the interna-
tional community, especially two central geopolitical actors, the USA 
and China. In each case, what is at stake is power. This is the primary 
political challenge facing the regime in Khartoum, as understood by 
its leadership: how can it most effectively hold onto and re-
consolidate power?  
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The ruling National Congress Party (NCP) is known for lurching from 
crisis to crisis, as well as taking a fractured approach to the problems 
it faces – the long-used ‘divide and rule’ strategy, combined with gen-
erous forms of patronage, nepotism and cronyism, that has been effec-
tive in keeping the Bashir regime in power for so many years. Some 
consider this government as a crisis management mechanism. Certain-
ly the regime in Khartoum is under increasing pressure both from in-
side and outside the NCP. How it responds to these challenges, name-
ly appearing to seek to preserve power at all costs, perhaps indicates 
that the political balancing act is about to topple. Crucially, mounting 
pressure on the ruling regime indicates that this is a different govern-
ment than the one which negotiated the CPA a number of.years ago. 
Although the political actors in Khartoum have remained largely the 
same, it is essential that South Sudan and the international community 
recognize the changed circumstances in which the Sudanese govern-
ment finds itself. This implies the need to devise new approaches to 
Khartoum.  
 
These complex domestic political dynamics must also be seen in the 
broader context of Sudan’s economic crisis. The economic founda-
tions of the country have become very weak and continue to erode, 
especially as the stalemate over oil revenues persists. At a time when a 
large percentage of state resources continue to be spent on the Suda-
nese Armed Forces (SAF), the economy faces collapse and desperate-
ly needs international help, particularly with its crushing burden of 
external debt, estimated at US $38 billion. The IMF projects negative 
real GDP growth for the northern economy: –0.2% in 2011 and –0.4% 
in 2012. Foreign currency is scarce, the Sudanese pound has lost value 
against the dollar (about 70% since the split of the country), inflation 
is hovering at 20%, creating malaise and hardship among urban popu-
lations and adding a new layer of opposition to the government. Ex-
treme poverty is widespread. The UN Development Programme re-
ports that 46.5% of the population lives on less than US $1 per day 
and 31.8% children under the age of five are malnourished.  
2.1 Internal Party Divisions: the National Congress Party 
The NCP leadership circle is beset with deep divisions. Presiding over 
the breakup of Sudan has put Bashir in an increasingly difficult posi-
tion, both with respect to his own party, the NCP, and opposition par-
ties. The 75% loss of oil revenue as a result of southern secession and 
the current economic crisis in Sudan adds significantly to these politi-
cal pressures. The seriously reduced revenues make it increasingly 
more difficult for the regime in Khartoum to maintain and continue 
the system of political patronage (pay offs, financial gifts, high level 
appointments and so on), which has traditionally been the glue that 
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binds supporters to the NCP and Bashir, both in Khartoum and 
throughout the rest of the country. 
 
At present, it is unclear how deep the divisions within the NCP are. 
NCP leadership is not only opaque, but also adept at dissemblance. 
However, the party is undoubtedly embroiled in heated debate about 
the most effective way for the NCP to retain power. Opponents are 
divided into two camps: those who want to maintain the status quo 
(pro-Bashir), and those favouring a change of party leadership (anti-
Bashir).
20
 Those inclined to preserve the status quo are aligned with 
presidential assistant Dr Nafie Ali Nafie, a long-term supporter of 
Bashir, and deputy chair of the NCP, a party position of critical im-
portance to NCP leadership dynamics. Seeking to conduct NCP busi-
ness as usual, this side of the debate continues to regard a military so-
lution to the consolidation of power as credible. Although facing mul-
tiple threats (e.g., security, political, social and economic), Bashir and 
Nafie nonetheless consider the opposition forces to be weak and there-
fore easy to defeat by military means. Following southern independ-
ence, both men expressed the view that despite current crises, Sudan 
would eventually be stronger.
21
  
 
Anti-Bashir NCP members appear to have as flag-bearer First Vice 
President Ali Osman Taha,
22
 who has reportedly expressed interest in 
negotiating with opposition political forces and engaging in dialogue 
to narrow the gaps between the north and the south. Such moves have 
remained stalled by party leadership, thus sidelining what some see as 
this more moderate NCP camp. A public dispute between Taha and 
Nafie over southern independence seems to illustrate the deep frac-
tures within the NCP. Whereas Taha was seen to have made too many 
concessions to the south during the CPA process, and was consequent-
ly marginalized in the post-CPA period following the death of John 
Garang, Nafie was opposed to the split in the first place. In stark con-
trast to Bashir and Nafie, Taha has said that if establishing an Islamic 
state would lead to secession, then he would not do this. In a statement 
to African delegations participating in a recent NCP convention, Taha 
explained: 
 
We hope the other countries that live in similar experiences reach better solu-
tions. Because, in spite of our acceptance of the principle of self-determination, 
                                                 
20  Some commentators refer to a divide between ‘hardliners’ versus ‘moderates’ or ‘reform-
ists’, but such terms do not aptly capture the nature of debate within the NCP. Hence the 
characterization used here: those in favour of the status quo and those who seek a change 
of leadership; the pro- and anti-Bashir camps 
21  ‘South Sudan’s secession is not a model for conflict resolution’, Sudan Tribune, 27 No-
vember 2011.  
22  Taha is suspected of playing a key role in the crisis in Darfur, and human rights groups 
have accused him of having strong links to the purported Janjaweed leader, Musa Hilal, 
whom he is said to have helped get released from prison in 2003. However, Hilal later 
slammed both Taha and Nafie. 
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we feel it should not be the first choice on which can be built relations between 
the groups in the same country. We have to look for other alternatives.
23
 
 
Although Taha might be perceived as associated with pushing for a 
new way forward, this appears to be restricted largely to NCP party 
politics, despite calls for engaging the opposition and improving 
north–south dialogue. Taha is merely advocating an alternative route 
for the NCP to continue its hold on power – a change in top party 
leadership.
24
  
 
In early December 2011, President Bashir finally announced that he 
had formed a new government following four months of negotiations 
with both of the largest opposition parties, the National Umma Party 
(NUP) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP).
25
 The DUP joined 
the coalition government at the last minute, despite internal disagree-
ment about the decision.
26
 However, the NUP refused to join, with its 
party leader, former Prime Minister Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, stating: ‘The 
biggest failing [of the new government] is the absence of a declared 
political program which means the continuation of the old NCP’s pro-
gram which created the crises.’27  
 
As Bashir announced when the new government ministers were sworn 
in, ‘We have waited for long in a bid to involve the biggest number of 
the political forces in the new government and we have succeed-
ed…’28 Despite the multi-party character of the new cabinet, it would 
be wildly inaccurate to interpret this as a genuinely representative 
government. It is merely a façade in the bid to re-consolidate ruling 
power, as is reflected inter alia in the distribution of government port-
folios – the NCP retained responsibility for 11 key ministries. More-
over, Bashir has made it clear that he now perceives Sudan as more 
homogeneous since southern independence.
29
 This blatant denial of 
                                                 
23  ‘South Sudan’s secession is not a model for conflict resolution’, Sudan Tribune, 27 No-
vember 2011.  
24  Also seen by many as the leader of the regime’s Islamist faction, this is reinforced by 
Taha’s support for the imposition of Sharia law, whereby he has stated that those who op-
pose Sharia will be the first to be tried and punished under it.  
25  Beset by their own deep divisions, the two largest opposition parties have nonetheless 
tried to take advantage of Bashir’s weakened position in post-secession Sudan. However, 
so far these efforts have been undermined by internal party political differences (notably 
among youth factions in the Umma who seek leadership change), as well as rifts between 
these main opposition parties. Hassan al-Turabi, who founded the Popular Congress Party 
after his split with Bashir and the NCP in 1999, might best be regarded as a political wild 
card: considered to be Sudan’s leading Islamic ideologue, he is a canny long-term politi-
cal survivor and an unpredictable political strategist. 
26  In addition to the DUP, the new government coalition includes break-away factions from 
both the DUP and NUP, as well as break-away representatives from the SPLM-N. Ac-
cording to the Doha agreement, signed in July 2011, the new government also includes 
members from the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), a former rebel group from 
western Darfur. Source: ‘Sudan’s New Government Sworn In’, Sudan Tribune, 10 De-
cember 2011. 
27  Ibid. 
28  Ibid. 
29 ‘South Sudan’s secession is not a model for conflict resolution’, Sudan Tribune, 27 No-
vember 2011.  
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the rich diversity of the Sudanese population is further reflected in 
Bashir’s assertion that Sudan is ready for the implementation of Islam-
ic law.
30
 He seems to ignore the risk that South Kordofan and Blue 
Nile might become, in the very near future, the ‘new south of Sudan’ 
in terms of increasing potentials for civil war. As the situation appears 
to be shaping up at present, this could signal the launch of a re-run of 
Sudanese post-colonial history.
31
 
2.2 Troubled relations with the Sudan Armed Forces 
Greater fragility in Sudan is also related to growing rifts between the 
government and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), which has become 
increasingly critical of the regime in Khartoum. These tensions are 
potentially far more serious than divisions within the NCP. In July, 
Nafie came under fire from Brigadier-General Mohamed Ajeeb Mo-
hamed, who publicly denounced Nafie in al-Guwat al-Musalaha (the 
SAF newspaper) for signing a peace agreement that would have re-
cognized the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-
N) as a legitimate political party in Sudan. Referring to the agreement 
as ‘a betrayal of the nation and the faith’, Mohamed concluded by 
stating that the SAF did not understand many NCP actions and per-
ceived the regime as weak. He demanded that Bashir overrule Nafie, 
as otherwise the regime would face serious consequences. Bashir con-
ceded and disavowed Nafie’s decision to sign the agreement.32 Bashir 
also outlawed the SPLM-N. In turn, however, these actions only 
served to reinforce SAF perceptions that Bashir’s position is increas-
ingly weak and dependent on serving SAF interests if he wishes to 
remain in power. 
 
As with Bashir’s struggle to control the NCP, this raises questions 
about government control of the SAF, which appears to be acting of 
its own accord: 
 
Today the General Headquarters of SAF, not the National Congress Party (NCP), 
is calling the tune in Sudan. The NCP’s civilian leadership has been marginal-
ized by the generals, who, having agreed to withdraw undefeated from the south, 
feel the political class risks a compromise too far. That includes tolerating end-
less, unproductive talks with Darfur’s fractious armed movements. On May 5, 
five days after 11 soldiers died in an SPLA ambush in Abyei, the heads of the 
army and military intelligence presented President Omar al-Bashir with a de-
                                                 
30  Ibid. 
31  At the same time, however, the extraordinary challenges related to building South Sudan 
from the ground up mitigate against this possibility. The international community in parti-
cular would think twice before embarking on a similar path in this fragile region of  
Africa. 
32  Before this, in late April 2011, a clash between presidential security advisor and chief of 
intelligence, Salah Gosh, and Nafie also revealed power struggles in the NCP. After Gosh 
had approached two of the main opposition parties to explore whether either would be 
open to government talks, Nafie accused Gosh of betraying Bashir, who then sacked Gosh 
(who was also an ally of Taha in his long-standing rivalry with Nafie).  
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mand: ‘Authorize us to take any necessary action without prior consultation.’ 
Although the ultimatum was explicitly addressed to the international community, 
felt to be prevaricating over Abyei, it was also implicitly an ultimatum to the ci-
vilian leadership, including the president.
33
 
 
Clearly, Bashir cannot afford to alienate the SAF leadership any fur-
ther. To do so would expose him to even greater risks than he now 
faces within his own party. Reflecting a long-established practice in 
relation to maintaining the status quo, Bashir currently seems to be 
managing SAF disaffection through a strategy of ‘divide and rule’. To 
minimize the risk of a potential coup, he has attempted to fragment the 
SAF leadership and/or engage in the patronage that has traditionally 
served to bind together NCP support. His present power base appears 
to rely on personal loyalty and tribal alliances, as well as the goodwill 
of key officers within the SAF. 
2.3 Conflicts within Sudan 
At present, rebellion in Sudan now stretches from the western border 
with Chad to its eastern border with Ethiopia. Since Sudan lost one 
third of its territory, tens of thousands of people have fled their homes 
and many have been killed in the escalating violence. Combat be-
tween the SAF and SPLM-N, which began in June 2011, has dis-
placed an estimated 230,000 of the 1.2 million people living in this 
area. Beginning in early September 2011, violence in Blue Nile state 
has killed many, seen the arrest of hundreds of SPLM-N supporters, 
and displaced thousands. According to a recent UNHCR report, there 
are more than 30,000 Sudanese refugees, mostly from Blue Nile state, 
now living in western Ethiopia.
34
 Embroiled in violent conflict since 
2003, the UN estimates that the conflict in Darfur and the related hu-
manitarian crises it has created have killed 300,000 people and dis-
placed a further 2.7 million. Although violence has slowly tapered off 
since 2009, this region remains in a state of volatile instability. With 
Sudan battling on these different fronts, it is difficult not to character-
ize the country as already at war with itself again. 
 
Some of this violence may be defined in relation to key unresolved 
CPA issues: future governance arrangements for South Kordofan (the 
Nuba Mountains) and the Blue Nile states, where the popular consul-
tations on greater autonomy have not yet been implemented. Although 
these popular consultations are designed to determine the degree of 
autonomy and power sharing between these two states and central 
government in Khartoum (as opposed to full independence), Bashir 
                                                 
33  Julie Flint. ‘Return to War in Sudan’s Nuba Mountains’, Peace Brief 112, United States 
Institute of Peace, 2 November 2011, p. 4. 
34  Fatoumata Lejeune-Kaba, ‘Hundreds flee fresh violence on Sudan-South Sudan border’, 
UNHRC news, 06 March 2012. 
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perceives the prospect of greater power decentralization as a threat. 
One way to interpret the fact that the government in Khartoum has 
been ignoring these political processes, preferring to leave them unre-
solved for the time being, is to see it as part and parcel of the more 
general problem Bashir faces in relation to holding onto power. This 
may be understood from at least two different perspectives, neither 
without serious risks. 
 
First and foremost, the use of military power to suppress the ongoing 
conflicts (instead of opting for a political solution) is a smart move in 
light of SAF disaffection with the government in Khartoum.
35
  
Although Sudan is in a severe state of economic crisis, continued con-
flict in these regions nonetheless guarantees additional financial re-
sources for the SAF, as well as more opportunities for personal en-
richment, status and power among the military leadership. In turn, this 
may help ease tensions between the armed forces and the government 
– especially Bashir, who is dependent on the SAF to retain govern-
ment control. Perhaps an SAF pre-occupied with combat on several 
fronts, far away from Khartoum, will be too busy to cause more pro- 
blems for Bashir – even as this is probably a weaker motivation to 
avoid a political resolution of the conflicts. At the same time, how-
ever, this strategy poses its own dangers: it allows the SAF to flex 
their muscle and demonstrate their power to the government. Indeed, 
the generals appear to hold the upper hand now. As the Sudanese di-
rector of National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS),  
Mohamed Atta, recently pledged, ‘2012 is the year that will witness 
the crushing of all rebels whether in Blue Nile, Darfur or South Kor-
dofan’.36 This bodes ill for the possibility of political solutions to  
Sudan’s internal conflicts. It may also increase the chances of a mili-
tary coup as the SAF’s contribution to regime change. 
 
Second, and closely related, conflict on many fronts in Sudan serves 
to unify supporters of the beleaguered Bashir while working as a dis-
traction from his adversaries within the NCP and other opposition par-
ties (as well as the general public). Along similar lines, brutal displays 
of military might can work as an effective tool for discouraging civil-
ian dissent. Likewise, however, this can work to stimulate opposition 
forces in Sudan, as is demonstrated in repeated calls for regime 
change by the National Consensus Forces, a group of opposition polit-
                                                 
35  At the same time, however, there is growing disaffection within the SAF itself, especially 
strong dissatisfaction with the ongoing conflicts in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. In par-
ticular, SAF members recently complained about a lack of resources (in case of a full-
scale war with the south) and rampant corruption, and have called for political reforms to 
change the status quo which is threatening national security. See ‘Sudan army officers 
warn Bashir & Hussein against rush to war with south’, Sudan Tribune, 29 January 2012. 
36  ‘UPDATED – Sudanese military plane crashes in North Kordofan’, Sudan Tribune, 30 
December 2011. 
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ical parties.37 The formation of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front, an 
alliance between rebel militia groups in Darfur, South Kordofan and 
Blue Nile States, along with the SPLM-N, also offers further evidence 
that the regime’s policies lead to radicalization. Among armed militia 
rebel groups in these disputed territories, SAF aggression has only 
worked to escalate violence. Defining a vicious circle, in turn, this of-
fers continued justification for the regime in Khartoum to raise the 
military stakes (despite being unable to decisively defeat them). Like-
wise, this serves to reinforce an aggressive stance in negotiations with 
South Sudan on other outstanding CPA issues (see section 3 below). 
 
The conflict in Darfur also remains unresolved, deeply tangled over 
issues of ethnicity, and access to resources and power sharing. For 
some, the question arises as to what extent the independence of South 
Sudan can be considered a viable option for various stakeholders, par-
ticularly in Darfur. In turn, this raises the question of a piecemeal ap-
proach to the remaining CPA issues relevant to Sudan versus the value 
of initiating a national dialogue process in Sudan.  
 
Although Darfur has been somewhat more secure since 2009,
38
 the 
conflict continues to simmer, and local grievances over government 
neglect and issues of autonomy remain. This is a rapidly changing 
conflict environment, set to hair-trigger responses. Escalating violence 
in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states is also seen as a compromising 
factor in relation to a peaceful settlement of the Darfur conflict. De-
spite the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, signed in July 2011 by 
the Government of Sudan and the Liberation and Justice Movement 
(LJM), commitment to its full implementation does not appear forth-
coming. Questions remain as to whether Khartoum is ready for a polit-
ical solution, or would prefer to continue with military intervention – 
                                                 
37  The National Consensus Forces (NCF) includes the NUP, Hassan Al-Turabi’s Popular 
Congress Party (PCP), the Sudanese Communist Party and a number of smaller political 
formations. The NCF calls for the ruling NCP regime to be toppled through peaceful 
means—popular uprising and civil disobedience. Indicating the disarray of political oppo-
sition forces in Sudan, tensions are mounting between the NCF and the NUP. Source: 
‘Tensions escalate between Umma & opposition parties over regime change in Sudan’, 
Sudan Tribune, 18 March 2012. There are additional tensions between the NCF and  
Sudan’s Islamist parties and groups, who recently founded the Islamic Constitutional 
Front to advocate for the implementation of Sharia law. Members of the new group in-
clude the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, Salafi Ansar Al-Suna, the far-right Just Peace 
Forum (JPF) and a number of Sufi groups. NCP representatives were also present at the 
launch. Although attending the meeting in a personal capacity, Turabi was quick to disso-
ciate the PCP from the radical coalition. Source: ‘Sudanese opposition slams calls for Is-
lamic constitution’, Sudan Tribune, 1 March 2012. 
38  Better cooperation between Sudan and Chad since 2009 has been a positive influence in 
reducing violent conflict in Darfur. Prior to this, both Chad and Sudan were known to 
have actively supported armed rebels as part of a proxy war effort to topple their respec-
tive regimes. However after numerous violent attempts by rebel groups to effect regime 
change, both leaders concluded that a peace aimed at maintaining the political status quo 
was more mutually advantageous and would better serve their own interests. The recent 
toppling of Colonel Gaddafi in Libya has also helped to create an environment more con-
ducive to peace in Darfur, as he was likewise a known supporter of rebel groups through-
out the region, including the JEM in Darfur. At the same time, regime change in Libya 
has also increased the flow of small arms in the region, which contributes to instability.   
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which would be a mistake. There are further questions about the will-
ingness of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) to reach an 
agreement with Bashir versus their intent to provoke regime change.  
The most significant of the armed groups in Darfur, the JEM, did not 
sign the Doha peace agreement. Efforts to formulate their own peace 
agreement with Khartoum so far have come to naught. Led by the UN, 
the AU and Qatar, the international community should advise both 
sides to reach a compromise. Such questions become even more im-
portant in light of SAF claims to have killed Dr Khalil Ibrahim, leader 
of the JEM, in late December 2011. Ibrahim’s death, along with public 
outcry against this, may in fact re-ignite fighting and deepen rebel 
commitment for regime change in Khartoum. This would further im-
pede implementation of the Doha agreement. It remains to be seen 
whether the newly-appointed members of the Darfur Regional Author-
ity, the group tasked with implementing the peace agreement, can 
make progress. Among other challenges, the representative nature of 
this authority is in dispute.  
2.4 The Arab uprisings: domino effects? 
The extent to which the Arab Uprisings may spillover into Sudan, fur-
ther destabilizing an already unstable situation, is anyone’s guess.  
Sudan has some remarkably similar characteristics to those of other 
countries in the Arab region that have experienced recent upheavals. 
The people are struggling to cope with rising costs of living, especial-
ly for food and fuel. Moreover, as a primary cause that sparked pre-
viously successful public revolts against the government, as happened 
in 1964 and 1985, growing social unrest and discontent could boil 
over – as it has elsewhere.  
 
Sudan’s population is also relatively young, with approximately 70% 
(including South Sudan) under the age of 30. Like their counterparts 
in other Arab states, many youth are unemployed and seeking political 
inclusion, especially given the old, aging, corrupt and self-interested 
political leadership that dominates party politics in Sudan. Young 
people are also opposed to the ‘Sudanization’ of the education curricu-
la, which prevents them from learning English and consequently limits 
their professional opportunities later in life, including the chance of 
jobs in the Gulf states. Having been in power for more than 20 years, 
Bashir is the only ruler many young people have known. Many think 
it is time for change. 
 
Alongside this, Sudanese civil society has been marginalized, co-
opted and manipulated for decades. Repeating past practice, recent 
demonstrations in Khartoum have also been rapidly infiltrated by the 
NISS. Despite such obstacles, civil society nonetheless remains an 
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essential advocate of genuinely democratic and representative govern-
ment in Sudan. However, any efforts aimed at more active citizen  
mobilization are greatly hampered by the lack of genuine political  
opposition in Sudan, an absence of leadership on the civil society side 
and the persistent threat of government repression.  
 
One significant difference between the Sudanese and their Arab 
neighbours who have taken to the streets is that the Sudanese popula-
tion is war-weary after decades of brutal violence and civil war. In 
this, Sudan and Algeria seem to be in similar situations – too trauma-
tized by conflict to want more deep social unrest. At the same time, 
Sudan seems to be on the verge of becoming engaged in civil war yet 
again in Blue Nile, South Kordofan and Abyei. If events in the broad-
er region are to have an effect on triggering change in Sudan, this will 
have a uniquely Sudanese character, rather than simply replicating 
events elsewhere. It is also not likely happen any time soon. 
 
These profound and multiple tensions indicate that the regime in 
Khartoum faces a range of governance issues, which in turn may lead 
to increasing instability if not properly addressed. These issues include 
civilian control of the armed forces, the gap between central govern-
ment and the periphery (a problem of marginalization), constitutional 
reform oriented to enabling more democratic and representative poli-
tics, transparency and accountability, and so on. In short, these are 
questions about power and difference. While poor governance may be 
seen as a root cause of violence, it is arguably also only a symptom of 
the blunt power politics that has dominated and defined Sudanese po-
litical history. Regardless of how it is understood, poor governance is 
clearly a central dynamic in relation to the ongoing conflicts.  
 
Although faced with such serious challenges, there are strong incen-
tives for the NCP (most notably Bashir) to hold onto power at virtual-
ly any cost. The international community offers what is perhaps the 
most compelling of these. This is not ironic, but gives rise to complex 
questions about sovereignty, international conflict management and 
international law, timing and sequencing, and how to uphold interna-
tional human rights obligations most effectively.
39
 If Bashir loses his 
status as head of state, he will consequently become more vulnerable 
to arrest on behalf of the International Criminal Court.
40
  
                                                 
39  Indictments against members of the LRA also have similarly uneven consequences: some 
of those facing indictments would like to leave the LRA but are afraid to do so precisely 
because of the indictments. Instead, they remain in the LRA and perpetuate the cycle of 
violence. Source: ‘The Lord’s Resistance Army’, policy briefing from the People’s 
Peacemaking Perspectives, a project of Conciliation Resources and Saferworld, October 
2011. 
40  Others who have been indicted alongside Bashir, include Ahmad Muhammad Harun (aka 
Ahmad Harun) and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (aka Ali Kushayb); Bahar Idriss 
Abu Garda; and Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus. 
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Domestic circumstances offer a parallel incentive for Bashir to main-
tain control. He has held on to power for more than two decades in a 
complex, shifting and violent political environment. In order to sur-
vive in and dominate such hazardous circumstances, he has made a 
range of deadly foes at home. Many of these enemies would not hesi-
tate to seek revenge if Bashir were to lose power. 
 
The Arab Uprisings also offer Bashir and the NCP a possible reason to 
hold on to power. While this has the potential to further destabilize 
Sudan, it also holds out the prospect of stronger allies emerging in the 
region. The Muslim Brotherhood has already made gains in the 2011 
Egyptian elections, perhaps further inspiring like-minded political par-
ties elsewhere in the region on similar trajectories. In the shorter term, 
the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in Libya brings with it the added 
potential benefit of making it more feasible for Bashir to reduce 
and/or remove the threat of rebel militias from Darfur (although at the 
same time, the flow of small arms from Libyan mercenaries into this 
region escalates potentials for greater violence).  
3. North–South Relations: Outstanding CPA issues  
The unresolved CPA issues that demand priority attention are the 
management of the oil sector, security protocols, demarcation of the 
disputed common border and the future status of Abyei. If not re-
solved, these issues may further destabilize relations between Sudan 
and South Sudan, and consequently the broader region. However, if 
progress can be made in dealing with these issues, that might promote 
more rapid normalization of relations between South Sudan and  
Sudan. This is fully in the interests of both countries – indeed, it is a 
necessity. The perspectives of the two neighbours, however, differ. 
For South Sudan, further to economic benefits, improved relations 
with the north would better enable the country to focus on its own 
domestic challenges, which are considerable. Although this is likewise 
the case for Sudan, with its own troubled domestic agenda and eco-
nomic recession, the government in Khartoum appears to believe it is 
in its interest to leave these outstanding issues unaddressed for the 
foreseeable future – NCP party-political divisions notwithstanding.  
 
Although this is a high-risk strategy in terms of exacerbating internal 
challenges, the motivations underpinning such an approach on the part 
of the ruling NCP government can be seen from two related perspec-
tives, both closely linked to Bashir’s bid to retain power at any cost. 
First, leaving key CPA issues unresolved effectively creates economic 
havoc and greater instability in the south. In turn, this sends a clear 
message that the consequences of any further attempts at secession in 
Sudan will be severe. Second, contributing to instability in South  
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Sudan, especially in terms of undermining the economy, represents a 
strategic move to ensure that the government in Juba is no longer in a 
position to provide support (military assistance, safe havens) to the 
rebel movements in Darfur, Blue Nile and South Kordofan. For an 
increasingly weak South Sudan, the costs of continued assistance 
would be too high, especially when these are weighed against the 
more pressing need to build a new nation state.  
3.1 Management of the oil sector 
The most pressing of these outstanding CPA issues concerns oil reve-
nues, upon which both countries are heavily dependent. Oil revenues 
constitute an astonishing 98% of government income in South Sudan. 
They provided some 90% of Sudan’s hard currency earnings before 
southern independence, which has caused its currency to devaluate 
sharply since July 2011.
41
 As a result of southern independence,  
Sudan has lost 75% of its national oil earnings.
42
 Because of the cur-
rent economic crisis in Sudan, as well as pressures in South Sudan, a 
negotiated settlement of the oil issue is crucial. 
 
Especially important is to agree on the share to be retained by each 
side (management of the oil sector; pipeline fees), without any further 
delays. Recent radical measures implemented by South Sudan, includ-
ing the stoppage of production, are unsustainable in the short to medi-
um term
43
 and have already exacerbated the deterioration of relations 
between the two sides. Although some work is underway under the 
auspices of the AU, the dispute must be brought to a swift conclusion 
that can address the legitimate aspirations of both countries. In No-
vember 2011, in a bid to resolve the dispute over oil revenue-sharing, 
the International Monetary Fund, the AU and South Sudan agreed on 
an amount of US $5.4 billion as appropriate compensation by the 
south to the north to make up for lost revenue, infrastructure expendi-
tures and investments. However, Khartoum requested nearly three 
times that figure – US $15 billion over seven years. That is an exces-
sive amount that can only produce a deadlock in the negotiations. It 
also signals Sudan’s unwillingness to reach agreement, despite the 
dire economic consequences. According to Pagan Amum, South Su-
dan’s chief negotiator, Sudan does not want the AU to mediate negoti-
ations.
44
 All of this gives rise to a critical question: how far is Sudan 
willing to go to get its share of the oil revenues? On the one hand, the 
                                                 
41  ‘Sudan: Country Says Fuel Subsidies a Big Burden On Budget, Hints At Removing It’, 
Sudan Tribune, 31 October 2011.  
42‘ Sudan to Cut Spending, Raise Revenue After South’s Secession’, Bloomberg Business 
Week, 06 January 2012. 
43  South Sudan is already exploring alternative pipeline options through Djibouti and Kenya 
(also see footnote 67 below).  There has also been talk of diversifying the economy to 
avoid oil dependency.  
44  Jared Ferrie, ‘Sudan Demands $15 Billion in Compensation for Lost Southern Oil’, 
Bloomberg Business Week, 24 November 2010.  
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high levels of interdependence between these two hostile neighbours 
could work as a deterrent to greater conflict. On the other, a continued 
stalemate in negotiations on this crucial issue might serve to provoke 
an all-out military confrontation between the two countries.
45
 
3.2 Security protocols 
The second priority for both countries is related to security protocols, 
in particular defining the nature and scope of military liaison and co-
operation between them. This includes protocols related to sharing 
intelligence, and confidence- and trust-building. In this regard, the 
2009 agreement on border cooperation between Chad and Sudan can 
offer a constructive example of a way forward between Sudan and 
South Sudan (also see section II.1 below). Moreover, both countries 
should include measures that leave no room for supporting rebellions 
and proxy wars in the other’s territory. It is important to preclude even 
the perception that this may be going on.  
 
Typical of the political brinkmanship between Khartoum and Juba, 
both sides accuse the other of such actions. For example, Khartoum 
accuses Juba of supporting SPLM-N forces in South Kordofan and 
Blue Nile, as well as offering support and safe haven to Darfuri rebels, 
notably the JEM. Following a similar line, Juba accuses Khartoum of 
arming rebel militias operating in the south, along with fuelling inter-
communal violence in the border regions. Both sides must back down 
from this dangerous rhetoric – and it is essential that they disengage 
from such activities. In particular for the south, the risks are high: 
Khartoum might see a stronger motivation to step up its efforts to de-
stabilize the south. Moreover, such support activities might justify and 
deepen northern reluctance to adhere to its responsibilities in imple-
menting the remaining CPA issues. South Sudan has nothing to gain 
from either outcome.  
3.3 The shared border 
A third area of priority concerns the demarcation of the contested 
common border line, which is closely related to the valuable natural 
resources in this area – oil, mineral wealth and agricultural schemes, 
as well as pasture lands. Today, the border regions remain highly mili-
tarized, with the active presence of SAF, SPLA, rebels and militias – 
notably the Misseryia militias. These realities reinforce the necessity 
of exploring the possibility of initiating joint border patrols. In fact, 
                                                 
45  In part, the recent confrontation between 700 SAF officers and Bashir (and Minister for 
Defence, Abdel-Rahmin Mohamed Hussein) was sparked by Bashir’s calls for prepared-
ness for war with South Sudan. Already over-extended and under-resourced at home, the 
SAF officers who lodged complaints baulked at the prospect of war with the south be-
cause of the current state of the SAF. Source: ‘Sudan army officers warn Bashir & Hus-
sein against rush to war with south’, Sudan Tribune, 29 January 2012. 
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security cooperation along the common border should be recognized 
as the best opportunity for building confidence between the armed 
forces of both countries. Joint border security operations are not diffi-
cult to organize, if there is political will, and they would certainly 
generate enhanced levels of trust between these suspicious neigh-
bours.  
 
Considered attention should also be given to the need for a ‘soft’ and 
porous border because of the local populations in these areas, which 
migrate on a seasonal basis. A soft border would also help nurture the 
traditional familial, social and economic ties between cross-border 
communities, which in turn could help to defuse local-level tensions 
and strengthen the interdependence of relations between South Sudan 
and Sudan. In contrast, a ‘hard’ border would pose new challenges for 
these communities to continue to interact with one another. It would 
also create even greater security demands and challenges for both 
countries.  
 
In conjunction with this, local border communities must be encour-
aged and enabled to re-establish traditional methods of nonviolent 
conflict resolution. Once effective in preventing and resolving local-
level conflicts, use of these traditional methods has diminished and 
eroded due to interference from national-level political forces in Khar-
toum and Juba. Urbanization, displacement and the proliferation of 
small arms, which are legacies of the civil war, are also factors that 
reduce the effectiveness of traditional approaches.
46
 In turn, this has 
led to prolonged violence and growing mistrust between the various 
tribal communities living in these border areas. 
3.4 Future status of Abyei 
It is critical to make progress on the future status of Abyei. If this is-
sue remains unresolved, there is a risk of even greater destabilization 
with respect to the area itself and in terms of north–south relations. 
Local-level conflict between the Misseryia and Dinka in Abyei is 
closely linked to national-level conflict between Sudan and South Su-
dan. As such, this creates conflict dynamics that are susceptible to rap-
id escalation. Despite this, both governments – Khartoum in particular 
– appear to be exploiting the Abyei issue as a political bargaining chip 
in the ongoing negotiations. At the same time, the local residents in  
Abyei are of significance to both Sudan and South Sudan.  
 
Military action by the SAF in Abyei, as well as along the 1.1.56 bor-
der, sends a clear message to Juba that Bashir does not want to lose 
                                                 
46  Rebecca Barber, ‘Getting it Right from the Start: Priorities for Action in the New Repub-
lic of South Sudan’, September 2011, Oxfam International, p. 9. 
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full control of the disputed territories. Although he accepted southern 
secession, he has now been signalling an unwillingness to agree to 
more territorial concessions. Among other things, the CPA left Bashir 
with the resource-poor part of Sudan. In terms of agriculture, land, oil 
and other commercially valuable minerals, the border areas are pro-
ductive parts of Sudan for Bashir to keep.  
3.5 Other issues  
If these key priority areas can be effectively addressed, this will create 
more favourable conditions for resolving the other remaining shared 
CPA issues. These include matters of citizenship, debt and asset dis-
tribution, and management of the waters of the Nile. Resolution of 
these priority issues is also critical for both countries to be able to es-
tablish the good relations that are expected between these two neigh-
bours and to allow them to address some the central security threats 
facing them both. Perhaps most importantly, normalization of rela-
tions between Sudan and South Sudan would allow each country to 
focus much-needed attention on its own challenging domestic agenda. 
 
Are the north and south willing to find ways of cooperating? Or will 
these two neighbours continue along the familiar path of mistrust, 
leading to even greater hostilities that could further destabilize their 
domestic situations and impact negatively on the broader region to 
which they both belong? Is there a real risk of all-out warfare between 
the two states, as some observers have forecast? How might the Afri-
can Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP)
47
 play a more 
effective role in relation to these key challenges? 
 
Unfortunately, the leaders in Khartoum seem more inclined to adopt 
hardline positions and settle old scores. Juba is also playing its own 
games. All this follows a deeply-entrenched historical pattern of 
brinksmanship, revenge and mistrust, characteristics that have defined 
the prevailing political culture in many areas of this unstable region 
for decades. However, to continue with this approach would be a seri-
ous strategic mistake for both countries. 
 
Instead, both leaders must recognize the importance of negotiations 
leading to workable political and economic solutions – for the sake of 
their own national, personal political and economic interests, and most 
importantly for the well-being of their populations. The incentives for 
peace must outweigh the incentives for violence. The AUHIP, chaired 
                                                 
47  Formed in 2008 by the African Union’s Peace and Security Council to investigate the 
crisis in Dafur, the AUHIP is led by former presidents Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, 
Pierre Buyoya of Burundi and Abdulsalami Abubaker of Nigeria. According to the 
AUHIP memorandum of understanding, negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan are 
divided into four themes, each with its own working group: citizenship; security; finan-
cial, economic and natural resources; and international treaties and legal issues. 
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by former South African President Thabo Mbeki, has been instrumen-
tal in bringing the two countries together, but there is scope for further 
engagement. This is a daunting task. While the AUHIP is the key 
mechanism for facilitating negotiation, it appears that leadership in 
Khartoum has only paid lip service to AUHIP initiatives. Hence, first 
and foremost, the AUHIP will have to regain some of its independ-
ence and neutrality vis-à-vis the key players. In particular, some recent 
statements by Mbeki have been perceived by Juba as too close to the 
agenda of Khartoum. Mbeki’s management of the AUHIP process has 
also been criticized for being authoritarian and non-inclusive, thus 
making it difficult for other key international actors (notably the USA 
and UK) to exert constructive influence over negotiations. If it is to be 
effective, the AUHIP must be even-handed in its approach. In addi-
tion, the ongoing process could gain greater momentum if the USA 
opted for more direct involvement, as was the case during the period 
leading up to southern independence.
48
 While Washington has 
acknowledged AUHIP leadership in the negotiation processes, it could 
nonetheless play a more active support role, to constructive effect.  
 
Given current trends, it is necessary to consider how the AUHIP might 
be better supported by the international community so that it can 
achieve its mandate. Special efforts are required towards the north, as 
Bashir and his supporters continue to be spoilers betting on military 
solutions – despite the glaring realities that only diplomacy and politi-
cal agreement can provide durable solutions to differences with Kiir 
and the Juba government. 
   
                                                 
48  US policy in relation to South Sudan and the broader region is discussed in Part III below. 
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Part II. Regional Dynamics:  
National Interests amidst Widespread 
Instability 
The states that share a corridor of fragility with the old Sudan (Chad, 
CAR and DRC) form what some have called the ‘tormented triangle’, 
referring to the process of regionalization of armed conflict facilitated 
by specific structural conditions increasingly apparent since the esca-
lation of conflict in Darfur began in 2003.
49
 Since the emergence of 
South Sudan as an independent state, this triangle has widened con-
siderably and may now be regarded as an ‘ellipse of insecurity’, with 
its main axis running from north to south, along the frontier line sepa-
rating the French-speaking states from the former Sudanese territories 
(see map above).  
 
This ellipse consists of the hinterlands of these three countries, on 
their eastern frontiers, and the corresponding border regions in Sudan 
(Darfur), as well as South Sudan (Western Bahr Al-Ghazal, Western 
Equatoria and Central Equatoria states). It also includes the northeast-
ern territories of the DRC. Geography and history have placed these 
areas far away from their respective capitals.
50
 When national and 
state-level authority is weak, merely symbolic or virtually non-
existent, such regions become fertile ground for the emergence of nu-
merous armed groups, local militias, outlaws and criminals. The inca-
pacity of national and state authority to exercise law and order, border 
protection and basic human security in these remote areas has trans-
formed them into one of the most dangerous parts of Africa. Such 
problems become worse when local populations flee to safer havens in 
neighbouring states.  
 
This ellipse constitutes a contiguous web of insecurity within a broad-
er region that is highly unstable. Our analysis must reach further afield 
to include reference to Uganda, given the security role the Ugandan 
People’s Defence Force (UPDF) plays in the region. Kenya, Ethiopia 
and Eritrea also merit comment as regards regional dynamics in the 
                                                 
49  For example, see: ‘The Tormented Triangle: the Regionalisation of Conflict in Sudan, 
Chad and the Central African Republic’, Jennifer Giroux, David Lanz and Damiano 
Sguaitamatti, LSE Crisis States Working Papers, series no. 2, April 2009, p. 3. The specif-
ic structural conditions identified by the authors include: state deficiency, uncontrolled 
hinterlands, general regional instability, cross-border trade, migration, and identity issues. 
50  Located in Central Equatoria state, Juba is an exception in terms of being a capital city 
that is in close proximity to the ellipse of insecurity. At the same time, much of South  
Sudanese territory remains isolated and difficult to access from Juba. 
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context of South Sudan as a newly emergent independent state. North 
of the ellipse, two Arab neighbours, Egypt and Libya, should also be 
noted.  
1. The Ellipse of Insecurity: Chad, CAR and DRC 
1.1 Chad 
For several years, especially from 2006 to 2009, the government in 
Chad regarded Sudan as a hostile neighbour. At that time, tensions 
between these two countries were a defining feature of regional insta-
bility. Khartoum openly supported the non-state armed groups op-
posed to President Idriss Déby by providing them with sanctuary in 
Darfur and logistical support.
51
 This support was critical in January 
and February 2008, when the Sudanese-backed rebels managed to in-
vade Chad, moving across more than 900 km, starting at the eastern 
border, to launch a direct attack on the presidential palace in 
N’Djamena. Again, in May 2009, more than 200 armed vehicles drove 
across the border from Sudan and for several days attempted to travel 
beyond the eastern region of the country. In the end, the rebel column 
suffered a crushing defeat, with the remaining rebels pushed back by 
the Chadian Armed Forces into Sudan. Khartoum subsequently real-
ized that supporting armed rebellion in Chad was no longer a viable 
option. Not only had the weaknesses and incapacities of these forces 
become obvious, but Bashir lacked the necessary political support 
within the NCP due to a rapid decline in public finances. 
 
As payback during these years, the Déby government covertly tolerat-
ed the presence of the JEM in Chad to regroup, recruit fighters and 
channel necessary materiel for its operations in Darfur.
52
 In addition to 
the obvious motivation of supporting Bashir’s opponents because he 
supported Déby’s opponents, tribal affinities offered another level of 
justification for tacit support to the JEM: Déby and the late leader of 
the JEM both belonged to the Zaghawa ethnic group and were distant 
relatives.
53
 More generally, the ethnic compositions of both eastern 
Chad and Darfur are similar, with many such common ancestral bonds 
among these populations. On balance, however, primary responsibility 
                                                 
51  It was from Darfur that Déby himself launched the coup which overthrew the Habré re-
gime and brought him to power in 1990. 
52  While some of this materiel came from Libya, most of it came from undefined sources 
that have yet to be identified. 
53  However the binding character of these tribal affinities should not be overstated: prior to 
his support of the JEM, which began in 2005, Déby maintained an alliance with Khar-
toum, even attempting several times to arrest the JEM leader, Khalil Ibrahim, as part of 
this pact. Déby switched his alliance from Khartoum to the JEM because of internal party-
political pressures. In particular, the shift was an effort to appease the disaffected 
Zaghawa elites in his ruling coalition. Source: ‘The Tormented Triangle: the Regionalisa-
tion of Conflict in Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic’, Jennifer Giroux, David 
Lanz and Damiano Sguaitamatti, LSE Crisis States Working Papers, series no. 2, April 
2009, pp. 6 and 7.  
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for the crisis between the two countries rests with the regime in Khar-
toum, which had been a lead instigator in perpetuating hostilities. 
Once Bashir came to the conclusion that maintaining the political sta-
tus quo in N’Djaména better served his own interests, relations be-
tween both countries rapidly normalized. In late 2009, Sudan and 
Chad signed an agreement to cease mutual aggression: Sudan agreed 
to stop backing armed opposition against Déby, and Chad agreed to 
expel JEM forces. They also decided to establish joint border patrols, 
which were fully operationalized in 2010. This approach has improved 
the security situation in eastern Chad, but its broader effect on the 
Darfur conflict has yet to be fully assessed.  
 
As of this writing (February 2012), the struggle for power within the 
inner circle of leadership in Khartoum and the Darfur peace process 
are key areas of concern for the Government of Chad. Chad must be 
seen as an interested observer of politics in Khartoum, rather than an 
active player. Despite an acrimonious past, relations between Déby 
and Bashir are now on good enough footing. However, this remains a 
precarious alliance. Government leaders in N’Djaména do not trust 
Bashir and the top NCP leadership. Although not in a position to in-
fluence the internal political dynamics of Sudan, the political leader-
ship in Chad would prefer to see a more reliable group of leaders in 
charge in Khartoum, with people who fully understand the mutual 
strategic interest of a sound relationship between both countries.  
 
If conflict in Darfur escalates this could have a serious impact in east-
ern Chad. From 2006 to 2010, this shared border region experienced 
major insecurity, with armed bandits and Janjaweed rebels operating 
on both sides of the border. They targeted humanitarian workers, refu-
gees and displaced persons, as well as some of the local communities. 
Such actions provided the primary rationale for the deployment of the 
UN peacekeeping operation, MINURCAT, in eastern Chad between 
2008 and 2010. However, when the joint patrols were operationalized, 
responsibility for security was handed over to both countries. As pre-
viously noted, the recent death of the JEM leader, Dr Khalil Ibrahim, 
could provoke revenge attacks by JEM rebels, many of whom believe 
that top political leaders in Chad may have shared the intelligence 
necessary to locate Ibrahim. However, the stronger presence of the 
Chadian armed forces in the border areas due to the joint patrols, and 
the overwhelming presence of state security agents in N’Djamena, 
would limit the reach of such potential attacks.  
 
Darfur provides the key link between Chad and regional instability, 
with its own domestic fragility also a contributing factor. For Chad, its 
eastern border regions remain the top security priority. Even now, af-
ter the improvement in diplomatic relations between N’Djaména and 
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Khartoum, and the interdiction of JEM activities in Chadian territory, 
civil war in Darfur continues to have a spill-over effect on these regi-
ons. Refugees, the availability of weapons in civilian hands and ban-
ditry constitute major impediments for the re-opening of the tradition-
al and profitable commercial routes between eastern Chad and Sudan, 
including the vital trade link between Abéché and the sea at Port Su-
dan. In addition, the end of the armed conflicts within Sudan – par-
ticularly those in South Kordofan and Blue Nile States – is also con-
sidered by Chadian leaders as part of the country’s strategic interests. 
For them, a stable and less conflict-prone Sudan would allow for a re-
orientation of Chad’s security resources to the western borders with 
Nigeria and Niger, where they see an expansion of violent religious 
extremism gaining ground, including the shores of Lake Chad.  
 
However, notwithstanding the fact that Chad is ranked as number two 
in the Failed States Index, it should be recognized that state authority 
has been significantly reinforced throughout the country over the last 
two years (2010–11). In particular, the armed forces have gone 
through an internal reform programme and are now far more profes-
sional than they were when the rebel offensive took place in May 
2009. While Chad remains a fragile state in a region of great instabil-
ity, it is at the same time one of the most stable – second only to 
Uganda. As such, perhaps Chad should be encouraged to play a more 
active diplomatic role in relation to ameliorating tensions in the re-
gion, in particular in Darfur. As noted, N’Djamena fully recognizes 
that peace and development in its eastern regions are intrinsically 
linked to stability in Darfur. Key Chadian politicians have their ances-
tral roots in these regions and would like to see them reconnected with 
the trade routes that used to link the Red Sea with this part of Africa. 
The international community should build upon this base and provide 
the necessary leverage to the Chadian leaders. 
 
Whereas constructive relations with Sudan are important to Chad, 
South Sudan is regarded as lying outside its area of strategic interest. 
Chad understands itself first as a Sahelian country, like Sudan, and 
second as a member of the Economic Community of Central African 
States (ECCAS).
54
 History, culture and tribal affinities have contribut-
ed to separating the identities of these two countries. In these circum-
stances, Chad does not feel directly threatened by domestic instability 
in South Sudan. However, the alleged support that the government of 
Southern Sudan might be providing to rebels in South Kordofan and 
Darfur could be perceived by Chad as running against its own strate-
gic interests and as an indirect threat to its security. Moreover, the 
spill over of LRA activities from Uganda via South Sudan into CAR, 
                                                 
54  ECCAS is a loose association of French-speaking countries and does not include South 
Sudan. 
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in a broad area that adjoins Chad’s southeastern region of Salamat, is 
followed with some degree of attention in N’Djaména. A further im-
portant concern in Chad related to South Sudan is about political prec-
edence: the regime in N’Djaména would not want the Chadian popula-
tion, particularly those of Bantu extraction, to see the secession of 
South Sudan as a model for their own future. However, this appears 
unlikely, as there is no real movement towards any type of split in 
Chad in the foreseeable future. Moreover, any attempt at launching 
such an initiative would be crushed early on by Chad’s wide-reaching 
security apparatus.  
1.2 Central African Republic 
The CAR remains an extremely fragile state – or what the Internation-
al Crisis Group has called a ‘phantom state’,55 despite several years of 
support from the UN Peacebuilding Commission.
56
 While the situa-
tion in the capital Bangui has changed for the better in recent years, 
the rest of the country remains largely disconnected from this centre, 
and the outreach of government institutions is highly limited.  
 
Despite a peace agreement in June 2008, there has been sporadic 
fighting and pockets of rebellion between government forces and 
armed groups in some parts of CAR, along with widespread banditry 
and criminal activity. Although a programme of national reconcilia-
tion has been agreed, the demobilization, disarmament and reintegra-
tion (DDR) programme has not been properly carried out, and many 
weapons remain in the hands of rebel militias, former combatants and 
criminal gangs. In particular, the government is not in a position to 
effectively exert state authority in the eastern regions bordering South 
Sudan: the regions of Vakaga, Haute Kotto and Haut Mbomou, as 
well in Bamingui-Bangoran, where a local armed group, the Conven-
tion des patriotes pour la justice et la paix (CPJP) compelled about 
8,000 people to seek refuge in southeastern Chad in 2009. 
 
These are vast geographical areas rich in mineral wealth, including 
diamonds, which are a primary source of funds for arms and critical 
bait for banditry. The border areas in the northeast (Birao and Sam 
Ouandja) are heavily influenced by the situation in Darfur. Both 
Chadian and Sudanese armed militias use this part of the CAR as a 
safe haven, a transit route and a base for criminal activity. The contig-
uous areas to the southeast (in and around Obo) also have direct links 
with South Sudan. They are the ideal grounds for armed gangs, rang-
                                                 
55‘ The Tormented Triangle: the Regionalisation of Conflict in Sudan, Chad and the Central 
African Republic’, Jennifer Giroux, David Lanz and Damiano Sguaitamatti, LSE Crisis 
States Working Papers, series no. 2, April 2009, pp. 6 and 7.  
56  The UN’s peacebuilding work in CAR, including the impact of the PBC, should be inde-
pendently assessed. CAR could offer a case study rich in lessons learned for the future 
work of the international community in preventing failed states from total collapse.  
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ing from large groups of illegal hunters to LRA fighters, and for a va-
riety of ethnic-based violent conflicts. This area – the shared frontier 
where CAR, DRC and South Sudan meet – is highly insecure and 
readily susceptible to repercussions from the current instability in 
South Sudan and Sudan. Heightened instability in either South Sudan 
or Sudan (particularly in Abyei), as well between both countries, 
could further negatively impact on the security dynamics in CAR. 
Greater stability in Sudan and South Sudan, along with more construc-
tive north–south relations, is therefore in the national interest of the 
Central African Republic. 
 
Although conflict in CAR is largely driven by internal root causes, it 
has regional dimensions as well. President Francois Bozizé seized 
power in a coup in March 2003 and was re-elected in January 2011 to 
serve another five-year term. Indicative of the regional character of 
conflict in CAR is the fact that Chadian regular forces and mercenar-
ies helped Bozizé seize power. Chadian soldiers were a central com-
ponent of his personal security force until the 2008 attack on 
N’Djamena, when many of them returned to Chad. However, some of 
those Chadians who have remained in CAR have been disillusioned 
with the failure of promised rewards to materialize as a result of sup-
porting Bozizé to seize power in the coup. They are now part of CAR 
rebel groups and criminal gangs, particularly in the northeast of the 
country. 
1.3 Democratic Republic of Congo 
DRC is the ‘fake giant’ of Central Africa: it is indeed the largest coun-
try, but has remained far too fragmented to be able to project its size 
in the neighbourhood. Too caught up in its own serious domestic trou-
bles, the DRC is not a relevant player in the region, even as it is heavi-
ly influenced by regional politics (Rwanda and Uganda). With pres-
sures inside and outside of the country, the DRC continues to be a sig-
nificant source of regional instability. It slipped down the Failed 
States Index from number five in 2010 to number four in 2011. Dur-
ing the civil war that raged in the DRC between 1997 and 2003, which 
also involved most of its regional neighbours, and in the current vio-
lence, the human cost has been unprecedented. Since the civil war, it 
is estimated that some 5.4 million people have been killed and approx-
imately 3.4 million forced to flee their homes.
57
 A study released in 
May 2010 indicates that sexual assault is so rampant that annual rape 
statistics would translate into 48 women being raped per hour,
58
 earn-
ing the DRC a reputation as the ‘rape centre of the world’.  
                                                 
57  ‘Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: an ongoing crisis’, International Rescue 
Committee, 2007.  
58  ‘Forty-eight Women Raped Every Hour in Congo, Study Finds’, by Jo Adetunji, The 
Guardian, 12 May 2010. 
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Recently re-elected President Joseph Kabila does not perceive South 
Sudan as important for his strategic interests – even though both coun-
tries share the same security challenges across their common border. 
There is also a risk that greater insecurity in South Sudan could spill-
over into the DRC, causing further instability there. As such, a more 
stable South Sudan should be seen as in the national interests of the 
DRC. Nonetheless the central government in Kinshasa is preoccupied 
by rebel militia activity in the eastern part of the country, notably in 
the Kivus, the two provinces bordering on Uganda, Rwanda and Bu-
rundi. It is here that the scant security resources available to the DRC 
are concentrated. However, the Forces Armées de la République Dé-
mocratique du Congo (FARDC), the state armed forces, are among 
the least effective in the world, and FARDC members have also been 
implicated in widespread human rights abuses against civilians.  
 
The northeastern part of the DRC, on the border with South Sudan, is 
closer to the direct or indirect influence of Kampala than Kinshasa. 
This vast region suffers from very poor infrastructure and difficult ac-
cess in terms of transportation and communication facilities. Most of 
the time, the local state-level administration is disconnected from cen-
tral government authorities and very weak. State control in this part of 
the DRC is mediocre at best. Ugandan army units have been operating 
in the region up until recently (2010), playing roles that the DRC se-
curity forces have been unable to fulfil. The 2007 Arusha Agreement 
between the DRC and Uganda appears to have created a tacit division 
of labour between the two state security forces in terms of policing the 
border areas: the DRC takes care of the Kivus, whereas Uganda is re-
sponsible for the triangle of shared borders with the DRC, South  
Sudan and CAR, the primary purpose of which is to eliminate the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (also see section II.2 below). 
 
In addition to the very weak and non-functional state apparatus, a ma-
jor driver of recurrent violence is a wealth of high-value minerals – 
diamonds, uranium, gold and coltan (columbite–tantalite). In eastern 
DRC, militia groups and the state armed forces fight for control of and 
access to mines, thriving on the environment of instability this vio-
lence creates and sustains. 
2. A Key Regional Player: Uganda 
The role of Uganda in this fragile region must be taken into account 
for two primary reasons. First, under the direction of President Yoweri 
Museveni, the Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) has been 
playing a key role in the ellipse of insecurity, especially in the fight 
against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). When the Juba negotia-
tions between the government of Uganda and the LRA collapsed in 
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April 2008, the LRA re-armed itself, intensified its operations in the 
border areas between southern Sudan and Uganda and began a tactical 
move into DRC territory. Unable to attack the LRA in Sudanese terri-
tory (i.e., Darfur) because of the historically strained relations between 
the two countries, the UPDF instead just forced them out of Uganda 
and started chasing them in the DRC. The LRA was then pushed 
northwards, in the direction of CAR. Founded some 25 years ago by 
Joseph Kony, a Ugandan citizen, this most notorious armed group cur-
rently operates in the triangular area situated where the borders of the 
DRC, South Sudan and the CAR meet.
59
 
 
Second, Uganda is seen as, and actively seeks to be perceived as, a 
key ally to the international community in helping to stabilize the re-
gion. In many ways, Uganda has filled the regional diplomatic vacu-
um created by Kenya, which was obliged to look inward during 2007 
and 2008 because of its own domestic crisis. However, it is important 
to bear in mind that Uganda is ranked number 21 in the Failed States 
Index, thus indicating certain limits in relation to its capacity to serve 
as a stabilizing influence in the region. It also faces its own increas-
ingly unstable domestic situation. Despite this, and compared to other 
states in the region, Uganda is nonetheless an important partner for the 
international community. Its central geopolitical location and the rela-
tive strength of the leadership in Kampala have allowed Uganda to 
establish solid relationships with global powers, particularly with the 
USA and, more recently, with China.  
 
Uganda’s southern borders with Rwanda and Tanzania are relatively 
safe and Kampala’s political relations with the governments in Kigali 
and Dar-es-Salaam are friendly. To the east, the border region with 
Kenya is also regarded as safe and there is no major tension with Nai-
robi. In contrast, the border regions in the west with the DRC, and in 
the north with South Sudan, are considered highly vulnerable to armed 
militia groups. The security of those borders is top priority for the 
UPDF. At the same time, since the LRA was successfully evicted 
from Uganda, greater stability has returned to the north of the country, 
with many of the nearly 2 million people who were internally dis-
placed by LRA activity returned to their homes. Because of its relative 
peace and stability, Uganda also remains a haven for refugees, espe-
cially those fleeing from violence in the DRC and South Sudan (as 
well as some Rwandans, from previous crises).  
 
                                                 
59  LRA membership is estimated to be no more than several hundred, divided in small 
groups, for reasons of survival. However, such limited numbers do not hinder the LRA in 
terrorizing local communities, causing destruction, abduction, death and displacement. 
Since the collapse of the Juba talks in 2008, the UN estimates that in LRA-affected areas, 
more than 2,300 people have died and over 400,000 have been displaced. 
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Throughout the Sudanese civil war, from the mid-1980s onward, 
Uganda was a key ally of the SPLM/A, providing military and logisti-
cal assistance as well as diplomatic engagement. Moreover, the SPLM 
based part of its own diplomatic efforts in Kampala during the war. 
With deep historic, ethnic, political, military and economic ties be-
tween them, Uganda is a strong supporter of the newly independent 
government in South Sudan and therefore a critical ally in the consoli-
dation of its state authority. There is recent evidence that Uganda is 
offering military technical assistance to South Sudan. Uganda is also 
South Sudan’s biggest trading partner. In the end, the strategic inter-
ests of Uganda reside in having a safer northern neighbour, with an 
internal security environment strong enough to allow the expansion of 
Ugandan economic investments and business opportunities.  
 
In stark contrast, Uganda’s relations with Sudan have always been 
tense. Multiple factors explain these traditionally frosty relations. 
Uganda’s proximity to SPLM political ideals has created serious anti-
pathy to the political leadership in Khartoum, which is basically per-
ceived by Kampala as racist. Moreover, Uganda has never been com-
fortable with the militant Islamism promoted by Sudanese leaders. 
Among other things, the possible expansion of Islamic extremism is 
seen as a threat to Ugandan unity. Museveni’s formative years as a 
politician were also inspired by a secular, Marxist-influenced 
worldview, so a political leader like Bashir is seen to be reactionary, a 
relic from the past. Finally, Uganda has long been convinced that the 
Sudanese government is the main backer of the LRA, which is under-
stood as retaliation for Kampala’s support to the SPLM.  
 
This juxtaposition of loyalty to South Sudan and animosity toward 
Sudan gives rise to questions about whether a stable South Sudan is 
perceived as being fully in the Ugandan national interest. On the one 
hand, given the economic ties between Uganda and South Sudan, 
tense relations between Sudan and South Sudan could offer greater 
economic benefits to Uganda. The current instability in South Sudan 
also offers justification for increased military engagement by the 
UPDF. On the other hand, improved north–south relations might cre-
ate deeper divisions between Uganda and Sudan. For example, Kam-
pala has been hosting Minni Minnawi and Abdul Wahid al-Nur, which 
is not conducive for improving relations with Khartoum.
60
 The role of 
Uganda, then, may be a double-edged sword: is Uganda a regional 
peacemaker, or a source of instability in the pursuit of its own national 
interest? 
 
                                                 
60  Minnawi and Wahid are leaders of the Darfur rebel militia group, the Sudanese Liberation 
Movement. Having recently joined forces, both are intent on overthrowing the regime in 
Khartoum. 
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Both Museveni and the ruling National Resistance Movement party 
were raised on a culture of insurgency. This history of armed struggle 
inclines the current government to see national security and regime 
continuity as closely linked to addressing various dynamics that are 
beyond Uganda’s national borders. In this, eliminating the LRA offers 
chief justification for keeping the UPDF active and focused (especial-
ly in CAR), exerting regional political influence and enabling high-
ranking military officers who are key allies of Museveni to enrich 
themselves. Continued LRA activity in this part of the African region 
also offers Museveni an opportunity to strengthen his relations with 
the USA, as do coordinated Ugandan–Kenyan military actions against 
al-Shabaab in Somalia. Using the US agreement to send special opera-
tions troops as military advisors to assist in the fight against the LRA 
as an opportunity to flex his military muscle in the region, Museveni 
explained, ‘Better to call them US personnel, not troops... I cannot ac-
cept foreign troops to come and fight for me. We have the capacity to 
fight our wars.’61  
 
However, UPDF credibility among local communities in LRA-
affected areas in the DRC, South Sudan and CAR is debatable and 
sometimes quite low.
62
 Despite a civilian protection mandate, the 
UPDF has not been delivering this in practice. Not only do efforts to 
scale up the military offensive against Kony result in LRA retaliation 
on local communities, creating more violence, but some UPDF soldi-
ers have been accused of human rights abuses. Moreover, many local 
people are as suspicious of the UPDF as they are of their own national 
armed forces. In this part of the world, uniformed men are frequently 
associated with fear and repression, not protection and improved secu-
rity. 
 
Local perceptions of the LRA also vary across the region. In DRC and 
CAR many suspect the LRA presence to be a pretext for Uganda’s 
exploitation of those countries’ natural resources. In South Sudan 
people see the LRA as an instrument of Khartoum, used in turn by 
Uganda as justification for its occasional presence in South Sudan. In 
CAR, the LRA are considered a spill over from another theatre of war, 
and ultimately a problem for Uganda.
63
 
 
Despite these challenges, the UDPF is comparatively better trained, 
equipped and disciplined than other security forces in the region, espe-
                                                 
61  Richard Kavuma, ‘Threats and arrests in Uganda’, The Guardian, 8 November 2011. The 
US deployment in support of the UDPF is called Operation Observant Compass. It is a 
precursor of the Obama Administration’s new approach to US military deployments in 
out-of-area countries, which is primarily grounded in the use of Special Forces for well-
defined and well-targeted objectives. 
62  ‘The Lord’s Resistance Army’, policy briefing from the People’s Peacemaking Perspec-
tives, a project of Conciliation Resources and Saferworld, October 2011, p. 2. 
63  Ibid.  
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cially those from South Sudan, DRC and CAR. With US advisors now 
in the region, this offers the UDPF further incentives to comport 
themselves in a professional manner. Given the right kind of support 
and supervision, the UDPF could become a much more effective 
means for regional security. 
 
Moreover, an increasingly militarized Uganda has corresponding do-
mestic advantages – at least from the perspective of the ruling elite. A 
key concern for Museveni’s regime is to keep its authoritarian grip on 
power. His re-election in February 2011 for a fourth term has extend-
ed Museveni’s rule to 30 years. There are deep divisions between the 
ruling National Resistance Movement party and opposition parties, 
which are left with very little political space. Museveni has been ac-
cused of widespread official intolerance of dissent and using the secu-
rity forces to forcefully quell public protests against rising living costs 
(food and fuel), arrest political opponents and jail journalists.
64
 Intim-
idation appears to play a significant role in relation to political opposi-
tion, public protest and the press. In turn, this gives rise to questions 
about political freedom, the right to peaceful assembly, freedom of 
expression and protection for human rights in Uganda. 
 
In addition to political divisions and increasing social unrest, Uganda 
is plagued by crumbling health and education systems, rising unem-
ployment (especially among young people), very high inflation rates 
(estimated at 30–45%), pressures from rapid population growth, and a 
decaying infrastructure. In addition to petty corruption within the po-
lice, which has become a fact of daily life, there are also claims of 
high-level government and military corruption. Although economic 
development has been significant, this is not evenly distributed 
throughout the country, with half of the population still living on ap-
proximately US$ 1.00 per day. The increase in Chinese investments in 
Uganda
65
 has also fed into social unrest, with claims that the availabil-
ity of less expensive Chinese goods is putting local Ugandan shop 
keepers out of business.
66
 These growing domestic tensions offer fur-
ther rationales for the Ugandan security sector to remain strong, in 
turn reinforcing Museveni’s ambitions of being recognized as a pow-
erful leader in the region. The international allies of Uganda should be 
mindful of these contradictions. While supporting the positive role 
that Museveni can play in the region, they also have an obligation to 
                                                 
64  Amnesty International, Stifling Dissent: Restrictions on the Rights to Freedom of Expres-
sion and Peaceful Assembly in Uganda, 2011. 
65  Whereas the UK was formerly the largest investor in Uganda, China is now the lead in-
vestor: according to figures from the Uganda Investment Authority, for example, in 2010 
China created 6,117 jobs, compared to only 3,958 by UK investments. 
66  For example, in 2010 China exported $202 million in goods to Uganda. Revealing a huge 
trade deficit, Ugandan exports to China in 2010 totalled only $20 million. Source: ‘Locals 
cry foul as Chinese expand in Uganda’, Dispatch (Uganda news monthly), 29 August 
2011.  
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recommend the implementation of an effective programme for domes-
tic political reform. 
3. The Broader Region  
3.1 Kenya 
Kenya is an important ally of South Sudan, given the significant role it 
played during negotiation of the CPA agreement, particularly in 2003 
and 2004. It is likewise a key economic player in the region and an 
important trading partner to South Sudan. Not only has Kenya made 
some visible economic investments in South Sudan, along with Ugan-
da it also supported South Sudan’s membership in the EAC (while 
rejecting Sudanese membership bid on technical grounds).
67
 However, 
only passing reference will be made to the role of Kenya in the con-
text of regional instability. First and foremost, today’s political leader-
ship in Nairobi is preoccupied with its own domestic dynamics after 
the violence in connection with the presidential elections in 2007–
2008. Those events created deep wounds, challenging national identity 
and further fracturing Kenyan society. They have also had a serious 
impact on the vitality of the national economy. New presidential elec-
tions are to take place during the second half of 2012, with most of the 
main candidates already actively involved in pre-campaign activities. 
Second, the Kenyan security forces have been deeply engaged in the 
southern regions of Somalia, where they are combating al-Shabaab 
militias.  
 
Combined, these two factors – domestic politics and military engage-
ment in Somalia – along with the declining state of the national econ-
omy, critically limit the capacity of Kenya to deploy a meaningful se-
curity presence in the ellipse of instability, even though cross-border 
raids and tensions between communities in Turkana (Kenya) and 
Toposa (South Sudan) fuel further destabilization in the region: this 
impacts negatively on border security and carries the risk of a refugee 
influx to Kenya. These political and economic factors also curtail 
Kenya’s role in making a contribution to strengthening state authority 
in South Sudan. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that Kenya 
remains a reference point for many South Sudanese political leaders, 
who regarded Nairobi as a second home during the civil war in Sudan. 
                                                 
67  As an alternative to the existing pipeline through Sudan, plans to build a new pipeline 
through Kenya are in early stages of discussion. This could suggest that continued tense 
relations between Sudan and South Sudan might be regarded as in Kenyan national inter-
est. However, further speculation on this point is premature. More importantly, the pipe-
line is highly unlikely to materialize, especially given US opposition to this proposal on 
the grounds that remaining oil reserves in South Sudan are too limited to warrant such a 
large-scale investment. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that a new pipeline would have 
significant regional repercussions. It would be likely to cause irreparable damage to rela-
tions between Sudan and South Sudan, as well as dealing a fatal blow to the Sudanese 
economy – certainly unwise in the long term.  
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These individuals have maintained close relationships with key Ken-
yan political figures. Nairobi is also seen as a sort of safe haven for 
South Sudanese politicians who might fall out of favour in their home 
country.  
3.2 Ethiopia 
Ethiopia bears brief mention because it shares borders with both South 
Sudan and Sudan. Importantly, the government in Addis Ababa has 
decided to adopt a balanced and neutral policy towards both of its 
neighbours to the west. This is indicated by the mediating role Prime 
Minister Meles Zenawi continues to play between these two uneasy 
neighbours, including sending Ethiopian troops to join the UN mission 
in Abyei, and an agreement to monitor the border. Ethiopia is also 
willing to strengthen economic links with both countries. Above all, 
the political leadership in Ethiopia would like to see the outstanding 
CPA issues resolved, as well as greater stability and security in Sudan 
(most notably in Blue Nile state) and in Jonglei state in South Sudan. 
Unrest in these areas has once again increased refugee flows into 
Ethiopia and strains border security. In addition to the humanitarian 
demands this places on Ethiopia and its own local populations, migra-
tion on such a vast scale compels the country to divert security forces 
to a border that, in terms of national interests, has no real strategic 
value at this stage. Rather, Ethiopia’s strategic security interests are 
focused on the situation in Somalia, as well as protecting its border 
with Eritrea. These border concerns are a higher priority for the politi-
cal leadership in Addis Abba. 
3.3 Eritrea 
Like its southern neighbour, Eritrea merits passing consideration here 
because of the Beja rebels. The Beja form the largest ethnic group in 
eastern Sudan, with a small number also living on the Eritrean side of 
the border. In October 2006, Eritrea facilitated the signing of a peace 
accord between the Sudanese government and the Eastern Front, an 
alliance of the Beja Congress and a small armed rebel movement 
called the Rashaida Free Lions. However, peace has not resulted in 
either power sharing or development in this remote region of Sudan. 
Instability and discontent have been growing. On 15 November 2011, 
for example, a dissident faction of the Beja Congress decided to join 
the Sudanese Revolutionary Front. Although Eritrea has been accused 
of supporting rebels in Darfur, thus straining relations between Asma-
ra and Khartoum, the country’s concern since southern independence 
has been to maintain sound diplomatic relations with Khartoum and to 
avoid being accused by Bashir of supporting Beja rebel bases in its 
own territory. There have been allegations that Eritrea is now supply-
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ing weapons to rebel groups in South Sudan in cooperation with Khar-
toum.
68
  
4. The Arab Neighbours 
Lastly, it is important to consider recent events in the Arab states, no-
tably in Egypt and Libya. Before being ousted in popular uprisings, 
the leaders of both of these countries were key counterparts to the re-
gime in Khartoum. However, these were not strong alliances, but ra-
ther ambiguous strategic arrangements based on expedient self-
interest and mutual containment. Whereas President Hosni Mubarak 
and Colonel Muammar Gaddafi were secular Arab leaders, Bashir is 
an expressly Islamic politician, closer to the Muslim Brotherhood 
movements in both countries. While Mubarak was particularly keen to 
maintain the status quo, and thus not interested in destabilizing 
Bashir’s power base, Gaddafi was duplicitous: he entertained diplo-
matic relations with Khartoum, but could not resist his own predilec-
tion for supporting underground movements and rebel forces, espe-
cially those operating in Darfur. 
4.1 Egypt 
Egypt is the midst of its own turbulent democratic transformation. 
However, the current interim leadership continues to play an im-
portant role in relation to Sudan and regards itself as a strategic ally of 
the regime in Khartoum. Up until now, Egypt has been a secular state. 
Therefore one of its key historical concerns has been to ensure that 
Sudan would not be used as a rear base for the Muslim Brotherhood, 
which has significant influence in Sudan (through the National Umma 
Party, some factions within the NCP, and above all through those as-
sociated with Hassan al-Turabi and his Popular Congress Party), and 
other Egyptian radical Islamic militants. Notwithstanding his own Is-
lamist rhetoric,
69
 Bashir has long been considered by the leadership in 
Cairo as a safe bet – someone who could keep exiled Egyptian ex-
tremists on a short leash.  
 
At a time of large-scale change in the country, the interim leadership 
in Egypt is uncertain about what might happen if Bashir loses power 
in Sudan. To see Turabi and his radical supporters in power would be 
unacceptable for Egyptian national interests as these are perceived by 
the interim military rulers. However, the ascendance of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egyptian politics could change this. Uncertainty sur-
                                                 
68  Since 2009, Eritrea has been subject to UN sanctions because of its alleged links to armed 
groups in the Horn of Africa. The leadership in Asmara is also seen as playing a covert 
game in the ongoing dispute between Sudan and South Sudan.  
69  This uneasy strategic alliance is made even more complex by Khartoum’s assassination 
attempt on Mubarak in 1995. 
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rounds the National Umma Party, which is perceived within Cairo 
military circles as too weak in leadership capacity and therefore would 
potentially be unable to prevent Sudan from sliding into a state of po-
litical chaos. As previously discussed, another key concern for Egypt 
is the South Sudanese move towards stronger relations with Israel, in 
particular as this bears on management of the waters of the Nile. For 
Egypt, then, South Sudan is now of critical strategic importance, and it 
is essential for the leadership in Cairo to maintain balanced relations 
with both Sudan and South Sudan. 
4.2 Libya 
Gaddafi’s Libya was a major, if entirely ambiguous, player in the re-
gion – unpredictable, controversial, belligerent and complex. For ex-
ample, Gaddafi provided funds, logistics and political backing to all 
manner of rebel movements in the region – but at the same time, he 
cultivated state-to-state relations, trying to take advantage of this dou-
ble game to further the interests of the national elites in Libya. This 
was particularly the case with Sudan: one could see the investments 
Libya was making in Khartoum and, at the same time, meet rebel 
leaders from Darfur in the lobbies of Tripoli’s sea-front hotels, who 
had come to collect additional material support from the Gaddafi re-
gime.  
 
Above all, Gaddafi was feared because of his erratic policies and 
abundant resources. He wanted to be seen in the region as a combina-
tion of peacemaker and kingmaker. In terms of his peacemaker role, 
this was limited because Gaddafi was not prepared to accept any other 
mediation efforts than those where he could take the lead. Especially 
after his failed attempts to facilitate peace between Chad and Sudan in 
2008 (a framework also known at the time as the Dakar Process), in 
the end no leader in the region was really prepared to follow Gaddafi’s 
lead.
70
 On Darfur, Libya ended up excluding itself from the Doha dis-
cussions. As the regime unravelled, Gaddafi was left with the leader 
of the JEM, who had sought refuge in Tripoli in mid-2010, when Dé-
by decided that it was no longer advisable to host him in N’Djamena. 
 
With new authorities in Libya, the appetite for regional power politics 
and intrigue is now gone. Libya today is primarily concerned with 
domestic reconstruction and its own internal political fissures. At pre-
sent, any ambitions related to the broader region are limited to restor-
ing normalized diplomatic relations with its neighbours, with a clear 
focus on the Middle East and Arab states instead of Africa. Interest-
                                                 
70  In the end, the peace agreement between Chad and Sudan was facilitated without Gadda-
fi’s assistance, through direct talks between the two capitals. For some observers, this was 
an indication that the Libyan leader was already losing influence, in 2009, in this part of 
the Sahel. 
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ingly, one of the first visitors from the region to land in Tripoli was 
Bashir, who arrived in early January 2012. This was a significant 
event, taking into account the ICC’s decision on Bashir and his trav-
els. The key political message on the Libyan side was to make clear to 
its western partners that the new authorities in Tripoli intend to pursue 
an independent foreign policy. Bashir’s visit was also of domestic po-
litical value, sending a signal to the more radical factions within Libya 
that the current leaders appreciate what Bashir represents as a promot-
er of Islamist-inspired governance.  
 
PART III. Regional Geopolitical Inter-
ests: Comparing the USA and China  
Two primary international influences in the region are the USA and 
China, each representing entirely different models and modes of en-
gagement. Key aspects related to the roles of both countries will be 
considered here. 
1. The United States 
The USA has a long association with the southern regions of Sudan. 
As the civil war gained a new intensity in the early years of the 1980s, 
evangelical Christian churches in the USA took sides with their fellow 
Christians in southern Sudan. These African populations were por-
trayed as victims of northern Sudan’s Islamic leaders. Over time, both 
political advocacy in Washington and broader public opinion managed 
to place southern Sudanese issues high on the African agenda of sev-
eral US presidents. Supporting South Sudan became an important do-
mestic political issue, especially for more conservative activists linked 
to right-wing Christian groups. However, the issue of southern Su-
dan’s independence also had broader public appeal, including among 
them left-leaning political activists and Hollywood celebrities. During 
the 2000s, the Bush administration – with close ties to Christian evan-
gelical churches – was particularly engaged in promoting the end of 
the civil war and a peace agreement between the central government 
in Khartoum and the SPLM.  
 
US mediation was critical for the completion of the 2005 CPA agree-
ment. During the period between signing the CPA in 2005 and the ref-
erendum on independence in 2011, the USA played a major role in 
advising leaders from both the north and the south to adhere to the 
agreement and keep the peace. In many ways, the relative success of 
the transition phase is linked to this strong, proactive US engagement 
with key actors in Sudan. Nonetheless, the intensive political efforts 
on the part of the US administration and its Special Envoys concern-
ing implementation of the CPA also reveal a degree of strategic con-
fusion.
71
 In the end, this effectively benefitted hardliners in the north, 
as well as impacted on the neutral position of the UN and other inter-
                                                 
71  This was particularly true of the role of Major-General Scott Gration. As President Barak 
Obama’s Special Envoy, he was too concerned with producing results within a tight 
timeframe at the expense of creating local ownership of the process by the various  
Sudanese factions. 
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national partners, who found themselves under serious pressure to 
align their positions with the one advocated by Washington.  
 
Four examples illustrate this strategic confusion. First, there was a 
time during 2009 when the US administration seemed to have under-
gone a change of heart about supporting southern independence. After 
discussing these concerns with regional political leaders, along with 
key international partners deeply committed to and engaged in the re-
gion (like the UK and the EU), the administration in Washington rap-
idly concluded that it was too late to avoid partition. Consequently, 
the USA reverted to its original objective of ensuring a peaceful tran-
sition to independence for South Sudan. Second, the US administra-
tion appeared particularly concerned with the negative impact the un-
resolved conflict in Darfur might have on the process for southern 
self-determination. Following a series of frantic meetings with the 
JEM and government leadership in Khartoum, and with the endorse-
ment of Qatar, in July 2011 the US Special Envoy forced through a 
partial agreement. This was the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur 
Agreement, between the Sudanese government and the Liberation and 
Justice Movement (LJM), an insignificant Darfuri rebel group, along 
with a few other opposition personalities, with little real impact on the 
ground. Third, US ambiguity and lack of firmness concerning the sta-
tus of the border states (Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile) has 
played directly into the hands of the leaders in Khartoum, allowing 
them to justify pursuit of a military approach. Fourth, Washington has 
been ambivalent in its condemnation of Sudan’s aggressive actions 
against local communities and military incursions in South Sudan.  
 
US policy towards the region urgently needs new impetus and clarity. 
Washington is the most critical international power in this part of Af-
rica, especially when it comes to contributing to peace and compliance 
with human rights standards. However, strategic confusion and ambi-
guity has partially eroded US credibility, in particular since 2009. In 
Khartoum, this loss of credibility stems from the failure of Washing-
ton to live up to its promises on debt relief, as well as its agreement to 
remove Sudan from the list of states that sponsor terrorism. Instead, 
the USA is now attaching fulfillment of these commitments to a reso-
lution of the conflict in Darfur. A clear, focused and renewed ap-
proach would help to restore some of this lost credibility.  
 
The USA remains a major partner of South Sudan. At the International 
Engagement Conference on South Sudan, organized by the US gov-
ernment in Washington in December 2011, the Obama administration 
recalled its commitments towards the African nation: 
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 promote sound management of national resources and account-
ability to benefit the people of South Sudan 
 create a climate for investment and promote trade to facilitate 
economic integration and growth 
 strengthen education, health and agricultural sectors as the 
foundations for growth and long-term development of the 
South Sudanese people 
 encourage the participation of women and youth and respect 
the diversity of the people of South Sudan 
These areas of cooperation are complementary to the work of other 
key donors: Norway, the UK, Turkey, the UN and the World Bank. 
They place special emphasis on the development agenda, including 
the management of natural resources and private sector investment, as 
well as on key social sectors and agriculture. They include the promo-
tion of respect for diversity, which could be a major contributing fac-
tor to domestic stability.  
 
But neither the USA nor any other major donor has referred to the im-
portance of comprehensively addressing the root causes of conflict, or 
the much-needed reform of the security sector. Instead, they appear to 
take it for granted that South Sudan is above all a deeply underdevel-
oped country in urgent need of economic growth, proper management 
of its natural resources and good governance. This approach gives the 
impression that decision-makers in Washington are completely over-
whelmed by the extreme poverty and the formidable governance chal-
lenges facing South Sudan. The fragility dimensions might be recog-
nized by the USA and all other external partners, but at present it is 
difficult to discern any coherent assistance programme designed to 
address them. It is as if the South Sudan dossier had been transferred 
from the more political institutions in the donor capitals, to those in 
charge of development cooperation, including USAID. However, de-
velopment efforts cannot succeed without an effective and compre-
hensive approach to the security challenges that South Sudan faces, 
including the deep-rooted causes of these conflicts. 
 
In addition, current levels of support to South Sudan will be incom-
plete unless this is integrated in a larger US approach that takes into 
account the key role played by Khartoum. Peace and security in the 
region require a more productive US engagement with Sudan.  
Although the USA has acknowledged the AUHIP as the lead actor in 
negotiations over outstanding CPA issues, Washington can still play 
an important role, both by more actively supporting AUHIP initiatives 
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and offering worthwhile incentives that encourage both sides to come 
to agreement. Here it is crucial for the USA and other key actors to 
recognize that the leadership in Sudan is no longer of the same charac-
ter it was when the CPA was being negotiated. Southern independence 
has severely compromised Bashir’s grip on power and changed the 
political stakes in Khartoum. 
2. China 
China’s interest in the region is totally driven by economic considera-
tions, access to natural resources in particular. It is highly unlikely that 
the international community has forgotten the deal signed between 
China and the DRC in 2008, whereby the two agreed that China 
would invest US $ 9 billion in key infrastructure development
72
 in ex-
change for access to 10.6 million tonnes of copper and 600,000 tonnes 
of cobalt in the Katanga region. Seen from a Chinese perspective, this 
deal was intended as the beginning of a new and unique strategic part-
nership between China and its Africa partners – a partnership defined, 
inter alia, in relation to win-win economic cooperation. In short, the 
DRC deal was designed as a prototype that would be replicated in  
other African countries.
73
  
 
In the region, China is now the top investor in Sudan, the DRC, and 
Uganda. It has recently increased its investment in Kenya and is cur-
rently establishing deeper links with South Sudan, especially in the oil 
sector. This is likely to be of specific concern to Norway, which has 
also brokered deals in the oil industry. Here it is pertinent to recall that 
China managed to take over US oil interests in both Kazakhstan and 
Angola through political astuteness and other types of compensation. 
This may give rise to fears of a similar pattern of incentives in South 
Sudan.
74
 In both Uganda and Kenya, China has moved at breakneck 
speed to supersede the UK (historically the largest investor in these 
two countries) in economic investment. Trade between China and 
Kenya more than doubled between 2003 and 2005.
75
 Interestingly, 
however, more recent Chinese investments in Kenya signal a change 
of strategy: instead of focusing primarily on the extraction and export 
of raw materials, Chinese firms are also establishing local production 
                                                 
72  This consisted of: 3,215 km of railroads, around 7,000 km of roads, 177 hospitals and 
health centres, two hydroelectric dams, two universities and 5,000 accommodation units. 
Beijing also agreed to refinance the collapsing DRC mining sector.   
73  In the end, the International Monetary Fund stepped in to attempt to thwart the deal, but 
succeeded only in reducing it from US $ 9 to US $ 6 billion. 
74  Relations between China and South Sudan on matters related to oil are, however, very 
complex. They are affected by some serious misunderstandings, taking into consideration 
the Chinese investments in Sudan’s refineries and how such interests are perceived by the 
Juba authorities. 
75  ‘Chinese Manufacturers go local in battle for Kenya’s consumers’, African Investor, 11 
April 2011. 
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plants expected to create thousands of jobs for young Kenyans (as 
well as diminish the market shares of western multinationals).
76
  
 
Clearly, then, the Chinese approach to regional investment offers a 
stark alternative to typically western approaches to development co-
operation, which arguably have been defined in terms of conditionali-
ty. In general, the Chinese model of investment (also referred to as the 
‘Angola Model’ or the ‘Beijing Consensus’) is defined as follows: it 
takes place at a government-to-government level, with little attention 
to civil society or domestic investors; it is based on non-currency de-
liverables and barter; and focuses on building key strategic infrastruc-
tures (transport, extractive capacities, and telecommunications), along 
with developing the agriculture, health and education sectors. This is a 
long-term, ‘no-strings attached’ (i.e., a policy of non-interference in 
domestic affairs) approach to development that, however controversial 
among traditional donors and local populations, has gained considera-
ble support from African leaders in the region. 
 
This is economic pragmatism at its all-time best. It gives rise to a host 
of serious questions about economic diplomacy versus a western ap-
proach similarly based on economic interests, but with added empha-
sis on good governance, human rights, gender equality and so 
on. Recent comments about regime change in Libya, along with a re-
vamp in China’s broader image in the region – a shift toward a more 
‘soft power’ presence – have left some observers wondering if this 
large-scale African investor might be undergoing a change of tactics. 
In response to public outcry about the effects of Chinese imports on 
local entrepreneurs, as well as criticism directed at the tendency for 
Chinese communities to segregate themselves from host-country pop-
ulations, China has adopted a more active approach to social pro-
grammes, especially in the health and education sectors. Only time 
will tell whether this will be enough to quell local disaffection, stem 
popular resentment and prevent further social and economic cleavag-
es.  
 
Chinese investment aims to offer obvious benefits to local populations 
in this impoverished but resource-rich part of the world, but the results 
are clearly uneven. As has been the case with other oil companies, for 
example, Chinese oil companies are regarded as predatory: they are 
accused of forced displacements of local populations, environmental 
degradation and a lack of corporate social responsibility. Investments 
in a setting that lacks transparency and accountability also offer pri-
mary benefits to political elites and augment the visibility of dramatic 
income inequalities. China will have to take better account of the po-
                                                 
76  Chinese firms now have a strong presence in the telecommunications, automobile, bat-
tery, and food and beverage markets (ibid). 
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litical dynamics of the region, especially the need for enhanced human 
security, popular participation and equitable growth.  
 
People in this part of the world are highly insecure and do not see their 
governments as being able or willing to respond to their basic needs 
and concerns. In such contexts, radical transformations are common. 
Perhaps, then, one of the most effective potential levers for inducing 
China to take a more responsive political approach in this region is 
simply an appeal to the need to protect its own long-term economic 
interests and significant investments. Being seen as literally mining 
Africa has already backfired on Chinese interests (and will continue to 
do so), thus putting those very investments at risk. To counteract these 
negative effects, the importance of a proactive anti-corruption stance, 
better recognition of the need to contribute to stabilizing this fragile 
region and the value of constructive engagement with civil society 
cannot be underestimated.  
 
Sudan and South Sudan are serious testing grounds for China as an 
international actor, especially with respect to issues of governance that 
can create the foundations for stability, security and development in 
the region. Although China is making overtures to South Sudan, it 
must also maintain good relations with Sudan. This can position China 
as a key influential partner in the region, able to exert constructive in-
fluence on key players. For China, stability along the border, as well 
as within South Sudan (most of the oil reserves are located here) are 
seen as key strategic interests, thus offering motivation for more ac-
tive engagement. Some movement in this direction has been reflected 
in recent – and unusually bold – statements indicating Chinese con-
cern about Khartoum’s military aggression in the border regions. To 
reinforce the value of greater engagement and the constructive role 
China could play in the region, other members of the international 
community, especially the USA and other key donors to South Sudan, 
should look for ways of working closely with China in the region. Ex-
perience has shown that when there is a deliberate attempt by western 
countries to involve China in their African policy, as was the case in 
Chad in 2008–2010, the Chinese response is positive. 
 
Conclusions and Policy  
Recommendations 
1. Regional Dimensions 
1.1 The January 2011 referendum in South Sudan was a watershed 
event with wide-ranging and multi-dimensional political, eco-
nomic and social consequences – for the north and the south, as 
well as for relations between the two states. Moreover, the broad-
er region, including the regional balance of power, has been im-
pacted by the formation of this new state. A new equilibrium is 
emerging that places more emphasis on a sub-region defined by 
South Sudan and the states to its south, Uganda in particular. This 
in turn creates conditions for a more balanced relationship among 
the states of the region, especially vis-à-vis Sudan. The 1983–
2005 civil war in Sudan created ambiguous relations between 
Khartoum and other capitals in the region because some of them 
were openly sympathetic to the SPLM. The establishment of 
South Sudan and the new diplomatic balance this defines should 
be taken as an opportunity to enhance regional cooperation in the 
political and security fields, as well as in the economic sphere.  
 
1.2  South Sudan’s independence adds an additional layer of fragility 
to an area that can be characterized as an ellipse of insecurity, a 
vast area of violence (that moreover easily spills over into other 
countries, thus acquiring region-wide dimensions), systematic vi-
olation of human rights and poorly governed territories. The el-
lipse runs from north to south, along the frontier line separating 
the French-speaking states from the former Sudanese territories. 
It consists of the hinterlands of Chad, CAR and DRC, on their 
eastern frontiers, plus the corresponding border regions in Sudan 
(Darfur), as well as South Sudan (Western Bahr Al-Ghazal, 
Western Equatoria and Central Equatoria states). The incapacity 
of government institutions, whether at national, state or local lev-
els, to exercise law and order, guarantee border protection and 
provide basic human security in these remote areas has trans-
formed them into one of the most dangerous parts of Africa. This 
ellipse constitutes a contiguous web of insecurity, with large-
scale humanitarian consequences, within a broader region that is 
highly unstable. It will require the concerted efforts of the region 
and the international community to establish greater human secu-
rity in the area. Importantly, such efforts must reflect a regional 
perspective that is tightly integrated and coordinated, in contrast 
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to current piecemeal and ad hoc approaches. This regional per-
spective must also account for the specific security needs and ca-
pacities of these individual states. Alongside political and securi-
ty sector representatives, civil society actors should also be in-
volved in devising a region-wide security plan. 
 
1.3  Today, tense relations between Sudan and South Sudan dominate 
the regional landscape, threatening to cause even greater instabil-
ity in this already unstable part of the world. The top priority in 
terms of peace and security in the region is the normalization of 
relations between these two hostile neighbours. The implementa-
tion of pending Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) matters 
can provide the basis for a holistic approach to enhanced coopera-
tion between Sudan and South Sudan. The outstanding issues that 
demand priority attention include: management of the oil sector, 
especially oil revenue-sharing; security protocols; demarcation of 
the common border; and the future status of Abyei. If these four 
key priority areas can be effectively addressed, this will create 
more favourable conditions for resolving the other remaining 
CPA issues. These include matters of citizenship, debt and asset 
distribution, and management of the Nile waters. 
 
1.4 Beyond the outstanding CPA issues, the region is confronted with 
two other sets of priority challenges that require action. First, it is 
necessary to jointly address the pervasive insecurity in the area 
encompassed in the ellipse of insecurity, with special attention to 
domestic security problems in South Sudan and Sudan. Insecurity 
leads to increased violence and the proliferation of armed groups, 
systematic human rights abuses, mass migration and internal dis-
placement; it constitutes a major impediment to development and 
regional stability. Second, it is critical to promote political and 
economic cooperation among the states of the region, including 
Sudan. This will help mitigate the devastating effects of regional 
instability and lay the foundations of a more integrated and sus-
tained process of human development.  
 
1.5 Uganda is a key ally to the international community in helping to 
stabilize the region. It has the political will and the military ca-
pacity to go beyond its national borders and assist its immediate 
neighbours, particularly South Sudan, DRC and CAR. However, 
several crucial policy dimensions must be taken into account. 
Uganda is a strong supporter of the newly-independent govern-
ment in South Sudan and should therefore be in a position to play 
a significant role in the consolidation of its state authority. In 
stark contrast, Uganda’s relations with Sudan have always been 
uneasy. In such a context, it is important to ensure that Ugandan 
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assistance to South Sudan is not perceived as part of an aggres-
sive plan directed at Sudan. Such an approach could lead to 
greater instability, thus undermining Uganda’s potential to make 
a constructive contribution to regional stability. Moreover, rela-
tions with the international community in support of peace in the 
region should not be used as a shield to hide the need for demo-
cratization and better governance in Uganda itself. These two 
central provisos must be considered in relation to the role of 
Uganda as an important partner for the international community. 
Its central geopolitical location and the relative strength of lead-
ership in Kampala have allowed Uganda to establish solid rela-
tionships with global powers, particularly with the USA and, 
more recently, with China. The international security cooperation 
should be reinforced and strengthened to better enable the Ugan-
da People’s Defence Force (UPDF) to fulfill its obligations and 
deliver professional levels of service. This should be also com-
plemented by systematic political dialogue on governance reform 
in Uganda. 
2. Sudan 
2.1. Sudan is beset with its own large-scale internal problems, includ-
ing Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) involvement in a range of differ-
ent counterinsurgency campaigns throughout the country. None-
theless, Sudan has remained intent on being a trouble-maker in 
the region, with growing animosity toward the south. The key ex-
ternal partners will need to convince the leaders of Sudan that 
such a course of action runs against the long-term interests of 
their country: it distracts scarce public resources from productive 
investments and funding to ameliorate social needs; it indefinitely 
postpones urgently-needed reforms to establish more representa-
tive institutions of governance; it creates the regional instability 
that is a major discouragement for international capital in-flows; 
it provides justification to neighbouring countries to engage in an 
arms race and maintain large-scale defence structures; and it 
complicates the re-establishment of normal relations between Su-
dan, its regional neighbours and key international partners. At the 
same time, it should be fully acknowledged that the ruling NCP 
government that negotiated and signed the CPA is not the same 
government as that of today, due to mounting internal party polit-
ical divisions and increased domestic challenges. New approach-
es to Khartoum are necessary. 
 
2.2 The secession of the south has destabilized the centre of gravity 
of power in Khartoum, with the Sudanese regime feeling increas-
ingly under threat and critically weakened, notwithstanding offi-
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cial declarations to the contrary. Indeed, Sudan is now a more 
fragile state than before the referendum for southern secession on 
9 January 2011 and the creation of South Sudan as an independ-
ent state six months later, on 9 July 2011. Its power elite are dan-
gerously divided. A renewed partnership with Khartoum would 
require the international community to encourage launching a na-
tional dialogue process aimed at democratization, decentraliza-
tion and political reform. New incentives for more genuine coop-
eration in these areas could prove constructive, provided they are 
defined in relation to achievable goals.  
 
2.3 With the exception of oil-related matters, which are considered 
highly urgent by Khartoum, particularly now that production has 
been stopped by South Sudan, the ruling National Congress Party 
(NCP) believes it is in its interest to leave key outstanding issues 
of the CPA unaddressed for the foreseeable future, despite some 
pressure from the world  community to resolve these. For the 
NCP, the unresolved issues offer a convenient rallying banner 
that can be used to shift the political focus away from the most 
pressing domestic reforms. In these circumstances, any strategic 
cooperation with Sudan should come not only in support of a 
domestically-led transformation process that can address political 
and economic cleavages, but also to help Khartoum to understand 
the vital importance of balanced relations with South Sudan.  
 
2.4 Qualified engagement with Khartoum is the only route to estab-
lish greater stability and security in the region. The international 
community should be mindful that the most important contributor 
to regional stability will be a cooperative government in Khar-
toum, willing to make use of international law and constructive 
diplomacy to guide its regional relations. The parameters of en-
gagement should be clearly defined, its conditions should be 
matched by corresponding incentives, such as debt relief, removal 
from the list of countries sponsoring terrorist organizations and 
even the application of Article 16 of the Rome Statute, which al-
lows the UN Security Council to advise the International Crimi-
nal Court (ICC) to defer from investigating a case, like the one 
against President Bashir. In terms of promoting greater security, 
the 2009 border cooperation agreement between Sudan and Chad 
could be used as a positive example: lessons should be drawn and 
its replication elsewhere encouraged, particularly along the com-
mon Sudan–South Sudan frontier.   
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3. South Sudan 
3.1 South Sudan is struggling to establish itself as a sovereign nation 
in a region of Africa defined by extraordinary fragility. The chal-
lenges of independence for South Sudan are shaped by three stra-
tegic issues. First, as in the north, it is imperative to find a solu-
tion to the outstanding CPA issues. The most urgent of these con-
cern oil revenues, border demarcation, and Abyei. Second, South 
Sudan is confronted with the imperative of building a stable and 
prosperous state based on a coherent and inclusive national iden-
tity. Among a host of pressing and overwhelming tasks related to 
building South Sudan as a nation state, the country will have to 
resolve its internal conflicts; undertake a comprehensive ap-
proach to creating an effective, credible and professional security 
sector; and better enable a truly representative form of govern-
ment at the central and state levels alike. The third strategic issue 
bears on the country’s external relations: these should focus on 
cooperation with its immediate neighbours, especially Sudan, and 
with key donors. 
 
3.2 The post-conflict processes related to demobilization, disarma-
ment and reintegration, as well as (national) reconciliation will 
need to be properly planned for by the South Sudanese govern-
ment, with the support of the international community. At pre-
sent, implementation of these types of activities remains largely 
ad hoc. State- and nation-building in South Sudan require a com-
prehensive conflict management package to help establish lasting 
peace and reconciliation within the country. The transformation 
of the SPLA into a modern professional army should also be an 
integral part of the post-conflict stabilization strategy. However, 
this is a major and complex undertaking that requires considera-
ble resources and a carefully planned programme, including close 
attention to issues of timing, and the need for a gradual and well-
balanced approach. Otherwise there is a risk that the process will 
become volatile, impacting negatively on already complex securi-
ty and conflict dynamics. It is vital to effectively include civil so-
ciety in this process. 
 
3.3 South Sudan and its key development partners could envisage 
linking up the current phase of national construction to the UN 
Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). The PBC could support the 
key nation-building processes, such as those related to inter- and 
intra-communal conflict resolution, the administration of justice 
and security sector reform. The PBC could also play a role in 
keeping the international community focused on assisting, in a 
coordinated manner, the most pressing institutional needs of the 
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new state. Of all possible cases, South Sudan is best suited for in-
clusion in the mandate of the PBC. 
4. The International Community 
4.1 The efforts of the international community should recognize the 
leading authority and responsibility of the African Union (AU). 
More specifically, it is necessary to consider how the AU High-
Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), led by former President 
Thabo Mbeki, might be better supported by the main external 
partners, including the USA, the UK and Norway. Here it should 
be borne in mind that the AUHIP still has an important mandate 
to achieve: to facilitate negotiations between the two states in or-
der to enable them to overcome hostility and settle the outstand-
ing CPA issues. In this context, public perceptions of the panel’s 
impartiality are critical for the success of its work. Mbeki and the 
other members of the AUHIP have to be seen as even-handed and 
neutral facilitators.  
 
4.2 The USA remains the most important international stakeholder in 
the region. It has been able to develop good relations with Ethio-
pia and Uganda, as well as maintaining a traditionally strong alli-
ance with Kenya. The USA is also deeply engaged in South Su-
dan. This commitment to nation-building in the south should be 
matched and complemented by more energetic investment in the 
political dialogue with Khartoum. US engagement in the region 
should not be limited to issues of development cooperation or 
military technical assistance, but should be comprehensive and 
clearly defined in scope. In addition to a more proactive political 
presence in the region, the USA should look for opportunities for 
joint actions with China in the stabilization of the region. 
 
4.3 China can play a major role in the normalization of diplomatic 
relations between the international community and Sudan. 
Among members of the Security Council, China has the greatest 
political leverage in relation to the leadership in Khartoum. It 
should also be able to play a constructive role in bridging the in-
terests of both Khartoum and Juba, and can be helpful in develop-
ing new incentives for both sides to cooperate. The USA and oth-
er key donors of South Sudan should look for ways to work 
closely with China in the region. China should likewise recognize 
that efforts aimed at increasing stability and security, within each 
individual state and at the region level, are in the long-term inter-
ests of protecting its own considerable economic investments in 
the region.  
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4.4  The international community should make a commitment to re-
sponsible and constructive diplomatic and economic engagement. 
The pursuit of individual national interests should help to foster 
greater stability and security in the region rather than serve to un-
dermine an already extremely fragile part of the world. This will 
require greater transparency and clarity on the part of those states 
that seek to establish or deepen diplomatic and economic rela-
tions with South Sudan, especially in highly sensitive areas like 
water management projects on the River Nile or investments in 
the oil sector.  
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